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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Torture is viewed as one of the most heinous violations of human rights.1 Article 1(1) of the 
UN Torture Convention (hereafter referred to as the ‘Convention’)2 defines this crime of jus 
cogens3 as 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by oNr at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. 
 In order to adequately prosecute the crime of torture, article 5(2) of the Convention 
obligates each State Party to establish universal jurisdiction over torture offenses in its 
domestic legislation. It seems appropriate that 30 years after the signature of the Convention, 
the implementation of article 5(2) of the Convention is evaluated. This dissertation presents 
an evaluation of universal jurisdiction over torture offenses. By doing so, it focuses on 
European States, in particular Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, all of which show a 
particular openness to prosecute torture offences on the basis of universal jurisdiction.  
The dissertation comprises five chapters, including the introductory and concluding 
chapters.  
Chapter two commences with a discussion of the meaning and history behind the 
concept of universal jurisdiction over torture. Thereafter, the focus is on the different ways in 
which European countries have implemented the obligation to establish universal jurisdiction 
in their own domestic legislation. It is argued that States that have in their domestic legislation 
a general statutory clause, which allows them to prosecute crimes for which international law 
requires the use of the universality principle, exercise the universal jurisdiction less 
effectively than States that have a specific provision authorising torture prosecution under the 
universality principle. 
                                                          
1 J H Brugers & H Danelius The United Nations Convention against Torture. A Handbook on the Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1988) 131. 
2 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (10 December 
1984) 1465 UNTS 85. 
3 J H Brugers & H Danelius op cit note 1 at 131. 
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 Besides these general and specific methods to implement universal jurisdiction, the 
European prosecutors and courts face some legal problems in the prosecution of acts of 
torture via the universal jurisdiction over torture.  
Chapter three therefore focuses on some of the legal problems that arise in respect of 
the application of domestic legislation, which implements the Convention. These include 
concerns about its scope, particularly ratione temporis and ratione loci. The two latter terms 
are defined and discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapters. Indeed, what is 
controversial here is the non-retroactivity of the implemented legislation and the legality of 
the universal jurisdiction over torture over citizens of States not bound by the Convention. 
 Moreover, the concept of universal jurisdiction is something that has been debated 
frequently. Chapter four clarifies and applies within the context of torture the three most 
controversial aspects of the concept of universal jurisdiction. First, the interpretation of the 
‘presence of the offender requirement’ in the State, which exercises the universal jurisdiction, 
that varies from one State to another. Secondly, the operation of a principle of subsidiarity 
continues to divide proponents and opponents. This principle of subsidiarity motivates a State 
ready to exercise universal jurisdiction over torture to defer the case to another State that has a 
stronger link with the crime and wants to prosecute it. Thirdly, some remaining obstacles 
(both practical and legal) are discussed that may prevent a successful prosecution. 
The abovementioned chapters assess to what extent the universal jurisdiction over 
torture is implemented in European countries, in particular Belgium, France and the United 
Kingdom. In addition to summarising the discussion that precedes it, chapter five offers some 
recommendations as to how the principle can be better implemented. 
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CHAPTER II  
THE CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER TORTURE 
 
A. Introduction 
Chapter two commences with a discussion of the meaning and history of the concept of 
universal jurisdiction over torture. Thereafter, the chapter focuses on the different ways 
European countries have implemented the concept, and how their approaches result in 
different prosecutorial outcomes. 
B. The meaning of the concept of universal jurisdiction over torture 
There is no clear judicial definition of universal jurisdiction.4 However, some internationally-
respected scholars understand it as 
 The principle that certain crimes are so heinous, and so universally recognized and 
 abhorred, that a state is entitled or even obliged to undertake legal proceedings without  regard 
 to where the crime was committed or the nationality of the perpetrators or the victims.5  
 In other words, universal jurisdiction is based on the most heinous nature of the 
international law crimes.6 
 Nowadays, international law, both customary7 and conventional,8 recognises universal 
criminal jurisdiction over torture. Such concept may be related to armed conflict.9 This 
                                                          
4 R O’Keefe ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 735 at 744. 
5 Principle 1 of The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (2001) available at https://lapa.princeton.edu 
/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf, accessed on 2 April 2015. 
6 Under Princeton Principle 2, such crimes include: piracy, slavery, war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes 
against humanity, genocide and torture. 
7 The customary international law status of universal jurisdiction over torture is shared by most States and 
scholars. See above and D V Hoover ‘Universal Jurisdiction not so Universal: A Time to Delegate to the 
International Criminal Court’ (2011) 52 Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference 
Papers 1 at 5. 
8 The treaties cited in notes 9 and 10 oblige States parties to empower their criminal justice system to exercise 
universal jurisdiction. See Amnesty International Universal jurisdiction: The duty of states to enact and enforce 
legislation (2001) 4. 
9 International humanitarian law includes common articles 49 and 50 of the Geneva Convention (I) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (12 August 1949) 75 
UNTS 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of Armed Forces at Sea (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 85; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 135; Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 287; art 85 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (8 June 1977) 1125 
UNTS 3; Council of the European Union The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction 
(2009) 7. 
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dissertation, however, lays aside humanitarian law considerations to focus on human rights 
law.10 
 Universal jurisdiction over torture offences is set forth in article 5(2) of the Torture 
Convention. It states that ‘each State Party shall … take such measures as may be necessary 
to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in 
any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him’. 
 The above provision requires each State party to establish jurisdiction over torture 
offences that have no nexus with their territory, except the presence of the alleged offender. In 
other words, the mere presence of an alleged offender under a territory under the State’s 
jurisdiction11 is sufficient to oblige that State to exercise its jurisdiction over the offences.  
 However, States can avoid the above obligation by extraditing the offender to a State 
that claims jurisdiction on the basis of the three traditional principles for establishing 
jurisdiction, namely the territoriality principle, the active personality principle, and the 
passive personality principle.12 These principles can be found in article 5(1) of the Torture 
Convention: paragraph (a) of the article allows States to prosecute a suspect, whatever his/her 
nationality, who committed an offence within their territory, while paragraph (b) enables 
States to prosecute an offence committed outside their territory if the suspect has the 
nationality of the State. Paragraph (c) authorizes States to prosecute extra-territorial offences 
if the non-national suspect has committed an offence against a victim that has the nationality 
of the State and if that State finds it ‘appropriate’.13 
 Thus, the Torture Convention establishes a regime of obligatory universal jurisdiction 
over torture offences, which is based on the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. The latter 
                                                          
10 International human rights law includes art 5(2) of the Torture Convention. 
11 The term ‘any territory under its jurisdiction’ must be interpreted as including all territories under the factual 
control of the State. See J H Brugers & H Danelius op cit note 1 at 131. 
12 However, States which not exercise jurisdiction are not obliged to extradite the offender to a State claiming 
universal jurisdiction. See below Chapter 3C. 
13 Article 5(1) of the Torture Convention states: 
‘Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences 
referred to in article 4 in the following cases: 
1. When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft 
registered in that State; 
2. When the alleged offender is a national of that State; 
3. When the victim was a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate.’ 
These bases which permit States to exercise criminal jurisdiction are consecrated — as the universal jurisdiction 
— by customary international law. As to the extraterritorial offences, a third base is often identified as the 
protective principle which allows State to prosecute a non-national whose have threatened a vital interest of the 
State.  Council of the European Union op cit note 9 at 11. T W Bennett & J Strug Introduction to International 
Law (2013) 50-56. 
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principle, as set forth in article 7(1) and (2) of the Torture Convention, obligates State parties 
either to prosecute the suspect present in its territory or to extradite him/her to a State which is 
willing to do so.14 While it is often said that this obligation is conceptually distinct from the 
universal jurisdiction one,15 the former obligation remains totally relevant to the latter issue. 
Indeed, article 7(1) and (2) of the Torture Convention obliges a State party to exercise the 
‘underlying’ universal jurisdiction that the Torture Convention also obliges it to establish. 
Therefore, a State party is not only bound to enable its justice system to exercise universal 
jurisdiction, but also to exercise it by means of prosecution or extradition.16 
 Finally the necessary ‘measures’ to exercise universal jurisdiction includes not only 
legislative measures, but also executive and judicial steps as to arrest, investigate, prosecute, 
or extradite.17 
C. The history of the concept of universal jurisdiction over torture 
Based upon the jus cogens prohibition of torture in international law, the Torture Convention 
wanted to contribute to the universal reaction to one of the most heinous violations of human 
rights under criminal law. Accordingly, its general purpose is to make the torture prosecution 
possible in all situations.18 Article 5(2) is thus the cornerstone of the Torture Convention.  
 The establishment of the universal jurisdiction system over torture is justified by 
several reasons.  
 Some of the reasons are practical. A prominent reason is the need to avoid impunity by 
preventing the alleged torturer from escaping the consequences of his/her acts by taking 
refuge in another country. Such situations are often attributable to a wilful failure (for 
instance, corruption or involvement of authorities, amnesties, lack of political will) or a lack 
of capacity (such as lack of inadequate legislation, lack of resources and security) of the 
                                                          
14 Article 7(1) and (2) of the Torture Convention states: 
‘1. The State Party in territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have committed any offence 
referred to in article 4 is found, shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, 
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. 
2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a 
serious nature under the law of that State. In the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 2, the standards of 
evidence required for prosecution and conviction shall in no way be less stringent than those which apply in 
the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 1.’ 
15 Indeed, the question of aut dedere, aut judicare arises logically after the establishment of jurisdiction via the 
vestment by the State of its courts with competence to try offence. 
16 Council of the European Union op cit note 9 at 10. 
17 J H Brugers & H Danelius op cit note 1 at 131. 
18 Ibid at 132. 
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territorial State to prosecute.19 These situations tend to be frequent in this time of increasing 
transnational criminal activity, encouraged by open-borders and globalisation.20 Other 
practical rationales are the absence of an exclusive international criminal court knowing all 
international law crimes,21 as well as the use of universal jurisdiction as a ‘catalyst’ for States 
efforts to permit an effective prosecution of the responsible, or as a general deterrent to crimes 
under international law.22 
 Other reasons for the establishment of the universal jurisdiction over torture are legal, 
philosophical and moral. First, States, as subjects of international law, must pursue 
international law crimes that destabilize the international law framework.23 Secondly, an 
unprosecuted suspect undermines the legal fabric where he/she is found, and discredits the 
State in its international relations.24 Thirdly, the international or universal character of 
international law crimes enables all States to exercise universal jurisdiction.25 Finally, torture 
is ‘so grave’ and ‘of universal concern’26 that it is seen as an attack on fundamental legal 
values shared by the whole international community, and, in some cases, on international 
peace and security.27 
 The last rationale refers to the origin given by many scholars to universal jurisdiction. 
The concept of universal jurisdiction is derived from The Law of War and Peace by Hugo 
Grotius, published in 1625. In his work, Grotius posed the right to freedom of navigation on 
the high seas. Since this right was applicable universally, it was concluded that pirates, hostes 
                                                          
19 Ibid at 133; M T Kamminga Final Report of the ILA Conference on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in 
Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences (2000) 564; C Ingelse The UN Committee against Torture: an 
Assessment (2001) 342; R Sifris Reproductive Freedom, Torture and International Human Rights (2014) 228.  
20 S Macedo ‘Introduction’ in S Macedo (ed) Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of 
Serious Crimes Under International Law (2006) 3. 
21 P Kirsch ‘The International Criminal Court: Current Issues and Perspectives’ (2001) 64 Law & Cont. Probs 3 
at 4-5; M Robinson ‘Preface’ in S Macedo (ed) Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of 
Serious Crimes Under International Law (2006) 16.  
22 M T Kamminga op cit note 19 at 564; Amnesty International op cit note 8 at 24-26.  
23 M Henzelin Le Principe de l’Universalité en Droit Pénal International: Droit et Obligation pour les Etats de 
Poursuivre et Juger selon le Principe de l’Universalité (2000) 412. 
24 Amnesty International op cit note 8 at 32. 
25 The United Kingdom originally opposed the inclusion of the universal jurisdiction over torture in the UN 
Convention, because torture offence have not an enough ‘obviously international character’. See J H Brugers & 
H Danelius op cit note 1 at 58. 
26 B Broomhall ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Towards the Development of an 
Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes under International Law’ (2001) 35 New Engl L Rev 399 
at 402. 
27 Amnesty International op cit note 8 at 32; R Sifris op cit note 19 at 227. 
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human generis (enemies of the human race), must be punished universally. All States shall 
have total jurisdiction over universal enemies.28 
 More than three centuries later, the Torture Convention and the Apartheid 
Convention29 remain the only human rights Conventions to ever provide for universal 
jurisdiction.30 However, the universal jurisdictional system, including the obligation aut 
dedere, aut judicare (prosecution or extradition) of the Convention against Torture is 
identically modelled on earlier international law treaties.31 
D. The different implementation of the concept of universal jurisdiction over 
torture in European domestic laws 
All European States, including Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, have signed and 
ratified the Torture Convention. Nevertheless, they adjust the obligation of establishing 
universal jurisdiction in their domestic laws differently, which has led to different outcomes 
in prosecuting torture. Their methods for implementing article 5(2) can be classified into two 
main categories, which are the general statutory clause method and the specific provision 
method. 
i) The general statutory clause method 
The first method of implementation takes the form of a general statutory clause, which a State 
introduces or relies on in its domestic law. This clause enables the State - its courts and 
prosecutors - to exercise universal jurisdiction over any crime for which international treaty 
law obliges such prosecution. As observed above, this obligation arises in relation to torture. 
Indeed, article 5(2) of the Torture Convention requires that a State party ‘take measures’ to 
establish universal jurisdiction over the crime of torture.  
                                                          
28 C Bassiouni ‘The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International Law’ in S Macedo (ed) 
Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law (2006) 
43. 
29 Art 5 of the International Convention on the Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid (30 November 1973) 1015 
UNTS 244. 
30 C Ryngaert ‘Universal Criminal Jurisdiction over Torture: a State of Affairs after 20 years UN Torture 
Convention’ (2005) 23/4 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 571 at 571. 
31 Art 4 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (16 December 1970) 860 
UNTS 105; art 5 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (23 
September 1971) 974 UNTS 178; art 3 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (14 December 1973) 1035 UNTS 167; art 5 of 
the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (18 December 1979) 1316 UNTS 205. See Amnesty 
International op cit note 8 at 4; C Ingelse op cit note 19 at 318. 
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 Belgium included such a statutory clause in its article 12bis of the 
Preliminary Title of the Code of Criminal Procedure.32 It states that 
 the Belgian courts … have jurisdiction to try offences committed outside the territory  of the 
 Kingdom that are specified in rules of international law established by  convention or custom 
 or rules of European Union secondary law binding Belgium,  when such rules require it, by 
 whatever means, to bring the relevant case before the  competent authorities to launch 
 proceedings. 
 Accordingly, Belgian courts have jurisdiction over any torture offence33 committed 
outside Belgium because international treaty law through article 5(2) of the Torture 
Convention obligates Belgium to prosecute the alleged torturer.34 
 However, States that rely on general enabling clauses tend to be more reluctant to 
prosecute torture offences. This is because the operation of the principle of legality,35 
especially its requirements of legal certainty and predictability, could hamper the inferring of 
universal jurisdiction over torture offences from the broadly formulated general statutory 
clauses. Sometimes, circumspection on the part of prosecutors may result in requalifying 
torture offences as other international crimes over which an explicit universal jurisdiction exists 
in domestic law.36 
 Belgium provides illustrations of the phenomenon of requalification. Indeed, Belgian 
courts and prosecutors have often qualified acts of torture as a crime against international 
                                                          
32 Loi contenant le titre préliminaire du Code de procédure pénale (18 April 1878) as amended in 2003 available 
at www.ejustice.just.fgov.be, accessed on 3 April 2015. Article 12bis was introduced by the law of 17 April 
1986. This initial version did not permit Belgian courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over torture on basis of 
statutory permission. Indeed, universal jurisdiction was limited for crimes included in the Convention on the 
Safety of Nuclear Material. Then, the law of 18 July 2001 authorized universal jurisdiction over crimes required 
by international treaty law. The law of 7 Augustus 2003 extended such jurisdiction to the international 
customary law. The law of 22 December 2003 added the rules of European Union secondary law.  
Compared with the early and important activism of Belgian jurisdictions in pursuing international humanitarian 
law crimes (see below), this absence of provision dealing with universal jurisdiction over torture until 2001 is 
surprising. See Belgium’s report to the Committee against Torture ‘Second Reports of States Parties under 
Article 19 of the Convention’ (14 August 2007) available at www.ohchr.org, accessed on 10 April 2015 at para 
1; W Kaleck ‘From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998-2008’ (2009) 30 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 927 at 932-35; B Fridman & L Hennebel ‘Translating Unocal: The Liability of 
Transnational Corporations for Human Rights Violations’ in M K Sinah (ed) Business and Human Rights (2013) 
248. 
33 The torture offence is criminalised in article 417bis of the Belgian Criminal Code (Code pénal) (18 June 1867) 
as amended in 2002 available at www.ejustice.just.fgov.be, accessed on 3 April 2015. 
34 This general statutory clause approach is particularly broader than, i.e., the Spanish one. While the former 
requires establishing universal jurisdiction for crimes required by international law (treaty and custom) and 
European law, the latter is limited to international treaty law. See article 23(4)(g) of the Organic Law of the 
Judicial Power (1 July 1985) available at www.wipo.int/wipolex/en, accessed on 2 April 2015.  
35 The principle of legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) is a fundamental one in most domestic 
criminal law, and is really anchored in Belgium. According to the Belgian Constitution (17 February 1994) 
available at www.dekamer.be, accessed on 4 April 2015: ‘no one can be prosecuted except in cases provided by 
law’ (article 12) and ‘no penalty may be imposed or applied except under the law’ (article 14). 
36 C Ryngaert op cit note 27 at 577; F Kuty Principes généraux du droit pénal belge: Tome I – La loi pénale 
(2009) 71. 
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humanitarian law, particularly as a crime against humanity. This is because Belgium does not 
have a specific provision that confers universal jurisdiction over torture. However, it has a 
specific statute that provides for universal jurisdiction over international humanitarian law 
crimes.37 
 For example, in the Pinochet case,38 an investigation was initiated in 1998 by a 
Belgian judge during Pinochet’s provisory detention in the United Kingdom. While the House 
of Lords qualified similar acts of Pinochet as torture, the Belgian judge qualified some acts as 
crimes against humanity. Several reasons can be advanced for this. First, Belgium had not 
ratified the Torture Convention at that time,39 unlike the United Kingdom, which has a 
specific provision for universal jurisdiction over torture but not for crimes against humanity.40 
Secondly, the Belgian non ratification of the Torture Convention could have been interpreted 
as a rejection of a norm of customary international law which has the same content than 
article 5(2) of the Torture Convention. Thirdly, crimes against humanity could have been seen 
as more heinous than torture and therefore more susceptible to universal jurisdiction than 
customary international law.41  
 Another example emerged after Belgium’s ratification of the Torture Convention. In 
the Habré Case,42 Chad’s former President was charged with both torture and crimes against 
humanity. Subsequent proceedings concentrated on the latter, which could have lead to the 
application of the Belgian law granting universal jurisdiction over international humanitarian 
law, thereby avoiding a probable loss of jurisdiction had the proceedings been focused on 
torture.43  
                                                          
37 Loi relative à la répression des violations graves de droit international humanitaire (5 Augustus 1993). This 
law was amended by the law of 10 February 1999, and was repealed by the law of 5 Augustus 2003, overall 
because of pressures of the international community following the many complaints filled in Belgium by foreign 
victims against high-ranking officials. See Belgium’s report to the Committee against Torture op cit note 32 at 
para 1; W Kaleck op cit note 32 at 932-35; B Fridman & L Hennebel op cit note 32 at 248. A similar approach is 
observed in Germany. See Human Rights Watch The Legal Framework for Universal Jurisdiction in Germany 
(2014) 1-7. 
38 Pinochet (6 November 1998) (Investigating Magistrate Brussels) (1999) 79 Revue de Droit Pénal et de 
Criminologie 278. 
39 Belgium ratified the Torture Convention on 9 June 1999, while it signed it on 4 February 1985. 
40 See below for the specific provision adopted by the United Kingdom. 
41 L Reydams ‘In re Pinochet’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 700 at 700-703; D 
Vandermeersch ‘Pinochet’ in J Wouters (ed) Bronnenboek Internationaal Recht (2000) at 131; R A Falk 
‘Assessing the Pinochet Litigation’ in S Macedo (ed) Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the 
Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law (2006) at 97-121. 
42 Habré (19 September 2005) (Investigating Magistrate Brussels) (unpublished). 
43 N Roht-Arriaza The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights (2004) 181-86; S P 
Marks ‘The Hissène Habré Case: the Law and Politics of Universal Jurisdiction’ in S Macedo (ed) Universal 
Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law (2006) 131-67.  
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 If going by Belgium’s approach, the qualification of torture acts as crimes against 
international humanitarian law ensures the observance of the principle of legality, it should be 
noted nevertheless, that the threshold of proof of the existence of the latter crimes is higher 
than the former. Indeed, torture crimes only require proof of one act consisting of ‘severe pain 
or suffering, whether physical or mental, … intentionally inflicted on a person for … [some] 
purposes…’44 International humanitarian law crimes diverge by requiring elements of 
organisation and intent: proving war crimes involves showing that the act is ‘part of a plan or 
policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes’.45 Similarly, prosecuting crimes 
against humanity requires proof that the act is ‘part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’.46 Likewise, genocide, 
another international humanitarian law crime, must be proved by showing ‘intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group’.47 
 Courts and prosecutors that qualify acts of torture as international humanitarian law 
crimes risk failure in their prosecution of such acts because of the higher threshold of proof 
that is required. As a result of such conduct by courts and prosecutors, a risk of implicating 
their State’s responsibility for non adequate compliance with the Torture Convention can-not 
be excluded.48 Indeed, according to the Committee against Torture, the obligation of article 2 
of the Torture Convention to take effective measures to prevent torture includes the State 
party’s obligation ‘to eliminate any legal or other obstacles that impede the eradication of 
torture’. The differences between the definition of torture in the Torture Convention, its 
incorporation and application in domestic law can lead to impunity. The prosecution of an act 
of torture under another qualification would be a violation of the Torture Convention.49 
Despite that, identifying torture crimes ‘will promote the Convention's aim, inter alia, by 
alerting everyone, including perpetrators, victims, and the public, to the special gravity of the 
crime of torture.’50 However, establishing a State party’s responsibility for having requalified 
an act of torture seems difficult. Indeed, in relation to the Torture Convention, up to now, only 
                                                          
44 Article 1 of the Torture Convention.  
45 Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) 2187 UNTS 90. 
46 Ibid article 7. 
47 Ibid article 6. 
48 According to the International Law Commission ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts’ (2001) available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddb8f804.html, accessed on 13 June 2015, 
the commission of an internationally wrongful act attributable to a State involves legal consequences, including 
cessation and non-repetition of the act (article 30), reparation (articles 31, 34–39) and countermeasures (articles 
49–54). 
49 However, the Committee gives only the example of a qualification under ill-treatment, which differs from 
torture in the severity of pain and suffering and may not require proof of impermissible purposes. 
50 Committee against Torture ‘General Comment 2, Implementation of article 2 by States Parties’ (2007) 
available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/general_comments/cat-gencom2.html, accessed on 5 April 2015. 
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one State party’s responsibility was concluded for having failed to establish universal 
jurisdiction over torture.51 Nevertheless, the International Court of Justice found in a recent 
judgment that the violation of an international obligation under the Torture Convention is a 
wrongful act engaging the responsibility of the State party. As long as all measures necessary 
for the implementation of the obligation have not been taken, the State party remains in 
breach of its obligation.52 
ii) The specific provision method 
The second method of implementing article 5(2) of the Torture Convention consists of 
introducing a specific provision that recognises universal jurisdiction over torture in the 
domestic code of criminal procedure. 
 This approach was followed by France and the United Kingdom among others, 
although the French and English methods are distinguishable.  
 France implemented article 5(2) in article 689-2 of the Code de procédure pénale as 
follows:  
 For the implementation of the Convention against Torture (…), any person guilty of 
 torture in the sense of article 1 of the Convention may be prosecuted and tried in 
 accordance with the provisions of Article 689-1. 
 The article does not include a direct link between substantive torture law and universal 
jurisdiction. It refers instead to article 689-1, which includes the general provision providing 
for universal jurisdiction if the perpetrator happens to be in France.53 According to article 
689-1: 
 Perpetrators of or accomplices to offences committed outside the territory of the 
 Republic may be prosecuted and tried by French courts either when French law is 
 applicable under the provisions of Book I of the Criminal Code or any other statute, or  when 
 an international Convention gives jurisdiction to French courts to deal with the  offence. 
                                                          
51 Guengueng et al v Senegal (2001) (Committee against Torture) available at http://www.bayefsky.com//pdf/sene 
gal_t5_cat_181_2006.pdf, accessed on 13 June 2015. The violation of article 5 (2) was established because of 
the failure to establish jurisdiction over the former President of Chad Hissène Habré. 
52 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) (20 July 2012) 
(International Court of Justice) ICJ Reports 2012 paras 95 and 117. 
53 Art 689-1 and 689-2 of the French Code of criminal procedure (Code de procédure pénale) (1 January 1994) 
available in English (Official translation) at www.legifrance.gouv.fr, accessed on 2 April 2015. However, the 
previous version of art 689-2 (1 January 1986) directly linked substantive torture law to universal jurisdiction: 
‘Any person guilty of torture committed outside the Republic territory … may be prosecuted and tried by French 
courts if he is found in France.’ See W Kaleck op cit note 32 at 936. 
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 The use of the term ‘may’ in these articles leads to the conclusion that implementation 
of article 5(2) does not oblige French courts to exercise jurisdiction, but only enables them to 
do so.54 
 A different approach to the specific implementation of article 5(2) was adopted by the 
United Kingdom, where the codification of the universal jurisdiction over torture offences 
directly relates to universal jurisdiction and substantive torture law. Indeed, s. 134(1) of the 
Criminal Justice Act of 198855 states: 
 A public official or person acting in an official capacity, whatever his nationality, 
 commits the offence of torture if in the United Kingdom or elsewhere he intentionally 
 inflicts severe pain or suffering on another in the performance or purported  performance 
 of his official duties. 
 It is observed that European State parties that have adopted a specific method of 
implementing article 5(2) of the Torture Convention tend to exercise universal jurisdiction more 
effectively. Indeed, the only known trials, in which alleged torturers were convicted under such 
jurisdiction, were conducted in those States.56 In contrast, State parties with a general enabling 
clause encounter obstacles in torture prosecution, especially over the principle of legality. They 
prefer either not to prosecute, or to prosecute after qualifying with specific legislation acts of 
torture as crimes against international humanitarian law. To summarize, the application of 
universal jurisdiction is more effective if it is sustained by a specific legislation. 
 States that have specific universal jurisdiction over torture also ‘recharacterise’ torture 
as another international crime, as States with a general statutory clause do. Indeed, the 
difference of jurisdictional regime may be used by State parties and prosecutors, for example 
to dismiss a complaint.  
 In the Munyeshyaka case, following complaints by Rwandan genocide survivors, a 
priest living in France was arrested by French authorities under rules of universal jurisdiction 
and was charged inter alia with genocide and torture. In 1995, the Nîmes Court of Appeals 
ruled that ‘the jurisdiction of the investigating judge should be exclusively assessed in view of 
the highest and most specific incrimination, that is, the crime of genocide’. While the Code de 
procédure pénale specifically provides for universal jurisdiction over torture (article 689-2; 
                                                          
54 B Stern ‘La compétence universelle en France: le cas des crimes commis en ex-Yougoslavie et au Rwanda’ 
(1997) 40 German Yearbook of International Law 280 at 280-89. 
55 S 134 of the Criminal Justice Act (1988) available at www.legislation.gov.uk, accessed on 2 April 2015. 
56 See below Sébastien N (7 April 2004) (Rotterdam District Court) (2004) 51 Netherlands International Law 
Review 444 at 444-49 (Netherlands); Ely Ould Dah (1 July 2005) (Gard Court of Assises) un-published (France); 
R v Zardad (18 July 2005) (Central Criminal Court) available at www.redress.org/news/zardad%207% 
20apr%202004.pdf, accessed on 5 April 2005 (United Kingdom). See W Kaleck op cit note 32 at 931-58. 
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supra), it does not provides for such jurisdiction over genocide.  Accordingly, France did not 
have jurisdiction to judge the crime of genocide committed abroad by a foreign national 
against other foreign nationals.57 In 1998, the French Court of Cassation quashed the 
judgement of the Court of Appeals, which had violated the article 689-2 ‘by affirming that 
only the qualification of genocide applied in the case’.58 The Court of Cassation ruled instead 
that French courts have jurisdiction from the moment ‘the criminal acts may qualify, under 
French law, as acts provided for in article 689-2.’ By this ruling, the Court wanted to prevent 
French courts to qualify torture acts as genocide in order to benefit from a discrepancy in 
international treaty law: genocide, regarded as the most heinous crime, is, pursuant to the 
1948 Genocide Convention, subject to a less vigorous jurisdictional regime than the crime of 
torture. Accordingly, these courts could ‘circumvent their authority or duty to exercise 
universal jurisdiction’.59 The latter statement illustrates the difference between Belgium’s and 
France’s approach to universal jurisdiction over torture. While Belgian courts try acts of 
torture as international humanitarian law crimes, and not as torture crimes, French courts only 
try such acts under the latter qualification. 
E.  Conclusion 
Since torture is one of the most heinous crimes in international law, the Torture Convention 
requires each State party to establish universal jurisdiction over torture in their domestic law. 
Thirty years after the signature of the Convention, two main methods of implementing this 
obligation in domestic law are observed.  
 The first method, adopted by Belgium, takes the form of a general statutory clause that 
enables the State to exercise universal jurisdiction over any crime for which international 
treaty law obliges such prosecution. However, the operation of the principle of legality makes 
States reluctant to prosecute torture offences and may result in requalifying torture offences as 
other international crimes.  
                                                          
57 Dupaquier et al v Munyeshyaka (20 March 1996) (Nîmes Court of Appeal) 4 Revue Générale de Droit 
International Public 1084. See A Cassese International Law (2005) 453. 
58 Munyeshyaka (6 January 1998) (Court of cassation) (1998) 102 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 
827 at 827-28. A new investigation was opened but the delay in the proceedings results in the France 
condemnation by the European Court of Human Rights for having violated the rights of victims to be heard 
promptly and compensated. See Mutimura v France (8 June 2004) (European Court of Human Rights) available 
at http://cmiskp. echr.coe.int, accessed on 5 April 2015. In 2006, Munyeshyaka was sentenced in absentia to life 
imprisonment by a Rwandan Military Court. Another prosecution remains pending in France: the Munyeshyaka 
case was transferred  to French courts by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 2008. For more 
information on this case, see The Hague Justice Portal ‘Munyeshyaka, Wenceslas (ICTR)’ available at 
http://www.haguejusti ceportal.net/index.php?id=10679, accessed on 4 April 2015. 
59 C Ryngaert op cit note 30 at 579; W Kaleck op cit note 32 at 938. 
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 The second method, adopted by France and the United Kingdom, introduces a specific 
provision that recognises universal jurisdiction over torture in the domestic code of criminal 
procedure. While this approach leads to a more effective prosecution of torture offences, 
States also experience the phenomenon of requalification, especially for the purpose of 
dismissing complaints. Moreover, within the numerous European States that have enacted 
laws, which provides explicitly for universal jurisdiction over torture,60 only a few cases have 
applied it, and this limited - but increasing61 - phenomenon began about 20 years after signing 
the Torture Convention.62 In fact, European prosecutors and courts face practical obstacles 
and unclarified legal questions in the prosecution of acts of torture via the universal 
jurisdiction over torture. The following chapters focus on these difficulties that prevent States 
from achieving successful torture prosecutions. 
 
CHAPTER III 
THE PROBLEM OF THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE UN 
TORTURE CONVENTION 
A. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on some legal problems that arise in respect of the application of 
European domestic legislation that implement the Torture Convention. The problems include 
concerns about the scope of the Convention (both ratione temporis and ratione loci). Indeed, 
what is controversial here is the non-retroactivity of the above-mentioned implemented 
legislation and the legality of the universal jurisdiction over torture over citizens of States not 
bound by the Convention. 
B. The scope of ratione temporis: the non-retroactivity of the implementing 
legislation of the Torture Convention 
The Torture Convention was signed in 1984 and implemented by States Parties well 
thereafter. The question arises as to whether presumed offenders could, under universal 
jurisdiction, be prosecuted for torture offences committed before the implementation of the 
                                                          
60 C Bassiouni op cit note 28 at 44. 
61 A H Butler ‘The Growing Support for Universal Jurisdiction in National Legislation’ in S Macedo (ed) 
Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law (2006) 
67. 
62 C Bassiouni op cit note 28 at 44. 
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Torture Convention. If the response of some national supreme courts and the International 
Court of Justice were that such prosecutions were not possible, the reverse could also be 
argued if it is established that there was a rule of customary international law authorising 
universal jurisdiction over torture, and that such rule existed before the implementation of the 
Torture Convention. 
 The United Kingdom’s House of Lords63 was the first Supreme Court judgment to 
refuse the retroactivity of the implementing legislation of the Torture Convention. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the Pinochet case dealt with a request by Spain for the 
extradition of the former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet for torture offences committed 
by him between 1973 and 1990. The House of Lords held that he was not extraditable for 
such offences committed before the entry into force of s. 134 of the abovementioned Criminal 
Justice Act of 1988. The majority opinion stated that acts of torture committed abroad were 
not punishable in the United Kingdom if they had occurred before the implementation of the 
Torture Convention that introduced the substantive crime of torture and created universal 
jurisdiction for English courts over it.64 This statement was based on the Extradition Act of 
1989,65 which allows extradition for conduct that would constitute an extraterritorial offence 
under the law of the United Kingdom in force at the time of the commission of the offence. 
 The Dutch Supreme Court followed suit in the Bouterse case.66 In the latter case, the 
Hoge Raad refused to apply the Dutch Torture Convention Implementation Act of 198967 to 
acts of torture allegedly committed in 1982 by Surinam commander Desi Bouterse (and thus 
before the Act came into force). According to the Hoge Raad, Dutch criminal law neither 
criminalised nor provided for universal jurisdiction over acts of torture in 1982.68 
 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) continued this trend in the Habré case.69 
While the ICJ concluded that Senegal had violated its obligation to prosecute or extradite 
Habré under the Torture Convention, it stated that the obligation did not apply to acts alleged 
to have been committed before the Convention had been entered into force by Senegal in 
                                                          
63 Regina v Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others (ex parte Pinochet) (24 March 
1999) (House of Lords) 38 ILM 3 at 581. 
64 Ibid at 585-88. 
65 S 1(3)(c) of the Extradition Act (1989) available at www.legislation.gov.uk, accessed on 15 June 2015. 
66 Wijngaarde et al v Bouterse (20 November 2000) (Amsterdam Court of Appeals) available at http://ljn.rechtsp 
raak.nl, accessed on 20 August 2015. 
67 Torture Convention Implementation Act (1989) available at www.legislation.gov.uk, accessed on 15 June 
2015. 
68 N Blokker & N J Schrijver Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2001) 287. 
69 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite Belgium Senegal supra note 52. 
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1987.70 The ICJ based its decision on article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties,71 which provides that unless a different intention appears, the treaty does ‘not bind a 
party in relation to any act or fact that took place or any situation that ceased to exist before 
the date of the entry into force of that treaty’. In this case, however:  
 nothing in the Convention against Torture reveals an intention to require a State party to 
 criminalize, under Article 4, acts of torture that took place prior to its entry into  force for that 
 State, or to establish its jurisdiction over such acts [namely universal jurisdiction] in 
 accordance with Article 5.72 
 Some justification could, nevertheless, be found to prosecute torture offences 
committed before the implementation of the Torture Convention in the late 1980s. To this 
end, Ryngaert argued that it should be demonstrated that there was a rule of customary 
international law authorising universal jurisdiction over torture, and that such rule existed 
before the implementation of the Torture Convention.73 
 A rule of customary international law authorising the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
over torture committed before the end of the 1980s would be based on the jus cogens nature 
of the prohibition against torture in international law.74 Some cases confirm this position. 
First, the Furundzija case held that 
 one of the consequences of the jus cogens character bestowed by the international 
 community upon the  prohibition of torture is that every State is entitled to investigate, 
 prosecute, and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture who are present in a 
 territory under its jurisdiction.75 
 Secondly, Lord Millett added in the abovementioned Pinochet case that while the 
jurisdiction of the English courts is usually statutory, it is supplemented by the common law. 
Therefore, English courts ‘have and always have had extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in 
respect of crimes of universal jurisdiction under customary international law [which is part of 
common law]’, including ‘the systematic use of torture on a large scale and as an instrument 
of State policy’.76 Lord Millett considered that by 1973 torture was included in international 
crimes of universal jurisdiction. Thus, English courts had universal jurisdiction over crimes of 
torture committed by Pinochet before the English implementation of the Torture Convention 
                                                          
70 Ibid para 102. 
71 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331. 
72 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite Belgium Senegal supra note 52 at para 100. 
73 C Ryngaert op cit note 30 at 585. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Prosecutor v Furundzija (10 December 1998) (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) 38 
ILM 346 at para 156.  
76 Regina v Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others supra note 63 at 650. 
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in 1988. However, Lord Millett conceded that the rest of the House of Lords recognised that 
there was jurisdiction only when the United Kingdom had ratified the Torture Convention.77 
 Thirdly, in the Bouterse case, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals stated that the Torture 
Convention had a declaratory nature, and that, at the time of the alleged commission (1982), 
customary international law considered torture as a crime, and authorised universal 
jurisdiction over it.78 The Hoge Raad, however, quashed the judgment on the ground that 
customary international law — which criminalised torture — could not prevail over contrary 
domestic law — which had not already criminalised torture in 1982. 
 The view propounded in the above three cases could be justified and defended by the 
exception to the principle of non-retroactivity79 included in article 7(2) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights80 and article 15(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.81 Pursuant to these articles, the principle of non-retroactivity 
 shall [not] prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act … which, at  the 
 time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law 
 recognized by the community of nations. 
 In view of both this international approach of the principle of non-retroactivity and the 
domestic principle of legality that prohibits the retroactivity application of law, Blokker & 
Schrijver argue that the principle of legality does not apply to procedural rules, including 
jurisdictional ones.82 Accordingly, the inclusion of universal jurisdiction in an act after the 
commission of a torture offence would be insignificant (procedural rule). The existence of the 
offence in law at the moment of the commission would be sufficient (substantive rule). A later 
extension of the domestic jurisdiction rule to universal jurisdiction would not make the ‘legal 
situation’ of the presumed torturer more prejudicial than it was at the time of the 
commission.83  
                                                          
77 A Bianchi ‘Immunity versus Human Rights’ (1999) 10 EJIL 2 at 244. 
78 Wijngaarde et al v Bouterse (20 November 2000) (Amsterdam Court of Appeals) available at http://ljn.rechtsp 
raak.nl, accessed on 20 August 2015. As seen above, this judgment was quashed by the Hoge Raad: as to these 
arguments, it held that customary international law, unlike binding treaties, could not prevail over contrary 
domestic law. Ibid at 287-92. 
79 C Ryngaert op cit note 30 at 586. 
80 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (4 November 1950) 213 UNTS 
221. 
81 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171. 
82 N Blokker & N J Schrijver op cit note 68 at 106-107. 
83 This approach was adopted by the Spanish Supreme Court, which states that the 1985 jurisdictional law which 
provides for universal jurisdiction ‘is not a substantive provision of criminal law’ as it ‘does not define or 
criminalise any act or omission.’ The law's effect ‘is limited to proclaiming Spain's jurisdiction for trying 
offences defined and punished in other laws. … The procedural rule in question applies no unfavourable 
sanction, nor does it restrict individual rights.’ Order affirming Spain's Jurisdiction to Try Crimes of Genocide 
and Terrorism Committed During the Chilean Dictatorship (5 November 1998) (Criminal Chamber of the 
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 The argument excluding the application of the principle of legality to rules extending 
jurisdiction is, however, criticised by Ryngaert on the grounds that the presumed offender 
could not have foreseen — on the basis of laws applicable at the time of the commission — 
that he would be prosecuted under universal jurisdiction. He could not, therefore, decide on 
whether or not to commit the acts in an informed manner. His situation would be prejudiced 
by this extension of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the legal uncertainty and unpredictability that 
arises from the extended jurisdiction could lead to the violation of the principle of legality.84 
However, one could critically wonder whether ignorance of the law is a valid defence, 
especially in the light of the Latin maxim nemo censetur ignorare legem (nobody is thought 
to be ignorant of the law). The Belgian Constitutional Court heard Ryngaert’s argument in the 
Erdal case.85 The Court held that a provision extending the scope ratione loci of the existing 
substantive criminal law is a substantive provision of criminal law, to which the principle of 
non-retroactivity applies. On that basis, the Court annulled a 2003 provision that provided for 
universal jurisdiction over some terrorist offences which, at the time of the alleged 
commission (1996), were not amenable to universal jurisdiction.86 The Belgian Constitutional 
Court did not, however, consider terrorism as an international crime that could have justified 
the application of the abovementioned international human rights exception to the principle of 
non-retroactivity.87  
 Ultimately, due to the lack of State practice and opinio juris, it seems difficult to 
deduce the existence of a customary international law rule authorising and a fortiori 
compelling (as the article 5(2) of the Torture Convention requires) universal jurisdiction over 
torture.88 Moreover, the judicial branch (per Lords Millet and the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeals), by authorizing universal jurisdiction over torture before the ratification of the 
Torture Convention, seems to be overstepping the limits of the separation of powers principle. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Spanish Audencia Nacional) available in English in R Brody & M Ratner The Pinochet Papers: The Case of 
Augusto Pinochet in Spain and Britain (2000) 99. 
84 C Ryngaert ‘Universal Jurisdiction over Genocide and Wartime Torture in Dutch Courts: An Appraisal of the 
Afghan and Rwandan cases’ (2007) 2 Hague Justice Journal at 21. 
85 Erdal v Conseil des Ministres (20 April 2005) (Belgian Constitutional Court) Moniteur belge of 3 May 2005 at 
25. 
86 C Ryngaert ‘Het arrest Erdal van het Arbitragehof: eindelijk duidelijkheid over de onrechtmatigheid van de 
retroactieve toepassing van extraterritoriale rechtsmachtuitbreidingen’ (2005) Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht at 345 
and 349. 
87 P Martens Rapport de la Cour d’Arbitrage (2005) 42. 
88 Y S Kraytman ‘Universal Jurisdiction – Historical Roots and Modern Implications’ (2005) 2 Brussels Journal 
of International Studies 94 at 117; C Ryngaert op cit note 84 at 21; S Laciner, M Ozcan & I Bal USAK Yearbook 
of International Politics and Law (2008) 133. 
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Indeed, universal jurisdiction affects foreign relations in an important way, a matter usually 
belonging to the legislative and executive branches of government.89 
 While the previous developments deal with the issue of the non-implementation of 
universal jurisdiction in domestic laws before the commission of the torture offence, in the 
French Ely Ould Dah case,90 the universal jurisdiction clause was already inserted into article 
689-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code de procédure pénale) before the alleged 
commission of the torture offences (1990). However, the substantive torture provision in 
article 222-1 of the Criminal Code (Code pénal) was introduced only in 1994. The Court of 
Cassation held that universal jurisdiction over torture was not retroactively applied, thereby 
not violating the legality principle. Indeed, the torture offence is defined in an international 
convention (the Torture Convention ratified by France in 1985 and entered into force in 
1987)91 which prevails over domestic law.92 Moreover, if torture was not an autonomous 
offence before 1990, it was already an aggravating circumstance of other offences of the Code 
pénal. The European Court of Human Rights confirmed that the French trial of Ely Ould Dah 
had not violated the European Convention of Human Rights’ prohibition on retroactivity.93 
Indeed, at the time of the commission, torture had been expressly provided for in the Criminal 
code (Code pénal). The Court stated that the fact that this offence only took the form of 
aggravating circumstances, and not separate offences is not decisive:  
 The perpetrator of a crime or major offence could in any event be legally accused of  such 
 acts, which constituted – on the basis of a special provision – supplementary  elements 
 distinct from the principal offence, resulting in a heavier penalty than the one  carried by the 
 principal offence. 
 Apart from a possible subsequent crystallisation of a customary international law rule 
authorising universal jurisdiction over torture, it is clear at this time that presumed offenders 
could not be prosecuted under universal jurisdiction for torture offences committed before the 
implementation of the universal jurisdiction clause of the Torture Convention. Such a 
prosecution would violate the prohibition of the retroactive application of law. In contrast, if 
the jurisdictional provision is implemented, the establishment of torture as an autonomous 
substantive offence is not required at the time that the torture was committed, as illustrated in 
                                                          
89 C Ryngaert op cit note 30 at 585-87. 
90 Ely Ould Dah (23 October 2002) (Court of Cassation) available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr, accessed on 13 
June 2015. 
91 See the definition of torture in Chapter 1. 
92 Article 55 of the French Constitution (4 October 1958) available at www.assemblee-nationale.fr, accessed on 
14 June 2015 asserts the primacy of ratified treaties over domestic laws.  
93 Ely Ould Dah v France (17 March 2009) (European Court of Human Rights) available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe .int, accessed on 13 June 2015. 
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the Ely Ould Dah case. If the issue of the scope for ratione temporis of the Torture 
Convention seems settled, it is far from being the case as regards the scope for ratione loci.  
C. The scope of ratione loci: the legality of the universal jurisdiction over 
torture over citizens of States not bound by the Torture Convention 
If the number of State Parties to the Torture Convention continues to increase,94 the status of 
the relationship of these States with non State Parties remains unclear. The most controversial 
issue concerns the possibility for State Parties, pursuant to article 5(2), to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over nationals of non State Parties, which are not bound by article 5(2).95  
 International treaty law prima facie refuses the possibility for State Parties, pursuant to 
article 5(2), to exercise universal jurisdiction over nationals of non State Parties, which are 
not bound by article 5(2). Indeed, the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt states that 
‘a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent’.96 
Each State is sovereign and free to decide to be (un)bound by a treaty.97 Accordingly, because 
article 5(2) of the Torture Convention applies only to State Parties, some scholars argue that it 
is not a basis for ‘universal jurisdiction stricto sensu’.98 
 In contrast, some scholars argue that treaty law is not violated by a State’s exercise of 
universal jurisdiction under article 5(2) over the nationals of non State Parties. Indeed, the 
Torture Convention does not impose obligations on non State Parties by providing for 
jurisdiction over their nationals. Moreover, no non State Parties’ rights are infringed upon by 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction over their nationals.99 Accordingly, under the Lotus 
Principle, which allows a State to exercise its jurisdiction on any matter so long as such 
jurisdiction is not prohibited by any international law rule,100 State Parties have a legitimate 
                                                          
94 As of 13 June 2015, the Torture Convention gathers 158 States Parties. The number of Parties is available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=fr, accessed 
on 13 June 2015. 
95 S R Ratner & J S Abrams Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law (2001) 162. 
96 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331. Pursuant to 
article 35, the consent must be written as to an obligation. 
97 S Laciner, M Ozcan & I Bal op cit note 88 at 133. 
98 K Randall ‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law’ (1988) 66 Tex. L. Rev. 785 at 788-89; R Higgins 
Problems and Process, International Law and How We Use It (1994) 63-64; Y S Kraytman op cit note 88 at 117. 
99 M P Scharf ‘Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party States’ (2001) 35 
New England Law Review 2 at 376-79; D Duquette Universal Human Rights: Moral Order in a Divided World 
(2005) at 183. 
100 S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) (7 September 1927) (Permanent Court of International Justice) PCIJ Series A 
No. 10 at 18 stated that ‘restrictions upon the independence of States cannot … be presumed’ and that 
international law leaves to States ‘a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by 
prohibitive rules.’ 
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interest in exercising universal jurisdiction over the nationals of non State Parties.101 
Following the same Lotus Principle, other scholars argue that neither the Torture Convention 
nor its domestic implementing legislation limit the application of article 5(2) to offences 
committed by the nationals of State Parties.102 
 However, the European rejection of the retroactivity of the Torture Convention 
developed in the previous section seems opposed to the application of treaty-based universal 
jurisdiction over the nationals of non State Parties.103 The presumed offender would be 
prosecuted for an offence that did not constitute a recognised crime in his/her State of 
nationality or even in the State in whose territory the offence was committed. Nevertheless, 
some scholars argue against this view and support the exception — few endorsed by State 
practice —104 to the prohibition of non-retroactivity for the crime of ius cogens.105 Similarly, 
Cassese submits that universal jurisdiction on the basis of an aut dedere aut judicare 
provision does not cover offences committed by nationals of non State Parties, ‘unless the 
crime is indisputably prohibited by customary international law’ or ‘the national of a 
noncontracting State engages in prohibited conduct in the territory of a State party, or against 
nationals of that State’.106  
 As to international customary law, the existence of a rule authorising State Parties to 
exercise universal jurisdiction over citizens of non State Parties on the basis of an aut dedere 
aut judicare provision is controversial. Some scholars argue that such an existence is 
unclear,107 or sustained by human rights activists without relevant analyses of state practice 
and opinion juris.108 In contrast, other scholars confirm the existence of a customary 
international law rule authorising State Parties to exercise universal jurisdiction over torture 
                                                          
101 M P Scharf op cit note 99 at 373.  
102 P Burns & S Mc Burney ‘Impunity and the CAT’ in C M Scott Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on 
the Development of Transnational Human Rights Litigation (2001) 281. 
103 See above Chapter 3B. 
104 S Laciner, M Ozcan & I Bal op cit note 88 at 133. 
105 See above Chapter 3B; M Morris ‘High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States’ (2001) 
64 Law and Contemporary Problems 13 at 64; M P Scharf op cit note 99 at 374; K Parlett ‘Universal Civil 
Jurisdiction for Torture’ (2007) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 385; R Sourani ‘Universal Jurisdiction 
Key Note Speech in XVII Congress of IADL’ (2009) available at http://www.iadllaw.org, accessed on 13 June 
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106 A Cassese ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality?’ (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 589 at 
594. 
107 See above Chapter 3B; C Ryngaert op cit note 30 at 586. 
108 Y S Kraytman op cit note 88 at 117. 
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against citizens of non State Parties.109 Their main argument is the ius cogens character of the 
torture offence, as illustrated in the above-mentioned Furundzija case.110 
 As to state practice, the International Law Commission lists two cases in which the 
presumed torture offender — who has the nationality of a non State Party to the Torture 
Convention — was prosecuted by a State Party on the basis of article 5(2).111 First, in the Ely 
Ould Dah case,112 French courts tried a citizen of Mauritania. Secondly, in the Mahgoub 
case,113 a Sudanese doctor was prosecuted under s. 134 of the 1988 English Criminal Justice 
Act114 which implemented universal jurisdiction over torture. However, two cases are not 
sufficient to support a claim that there is a customary international law rule authorising State 
Parties to exercise universal jurisdiction over citizens of non State Parties on the basis of 
article 5(2) of the Torture Convention. Instead, the State practice should have been both 
‘extensive and virtually uniform’ to conclude about the establishment of such a rule of 
customary international law.115 Other scholars can see the existence of a growing State 
practice by drawing a parallel with the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages 
(CATH),116 which includes a similar provision to article 5(2) of the Torture Convention.117 
The fact that in the domestic terrorism case law, the presumed offender’s States of nationality 
did not object to such a similar provision to article 5(2) could accelerate the development of 
custom, provided there is sufficient State practice.118  
 In the Congo v France case,119 the ICJ missed the opportunity to pronounce itself on 
the application of the UN Torture Convention to nationals of non State Parties.120 Congo 
protested against the French prosecution of Congolese officials, especially because France 
                                                          
109 International Law Association ‘Final Report  of the London Conference on the Exercise of Universal 
Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences’ (2000) at 8 available at http://www.ila-hq.org, 
accessed on 15 June 2015.  
110 See above Chapter 3B; Prosecutor v Furundzija supra note 75 at para 156. 
111 International Law Association op cit note 109 at 28. 
112 Ely Ould Dah (23 October 2002) (Court of Cassation) available at www.legifrance.gouv.fr, accessed on 13 
June 2015; Ely Ould Dah (1 July 2005) (Gard Court of Assises) un-published. See above Chapter 3B & below 
Chapter 4B. 
113 Charges were finally dropped, because for lack of evidence. See M Lattimer & P Sands Justice for Crimes 
Against Humanity (2003) 367. 
114 Criminal Justice Act (1988) available at www.legislation.gov.uk, accessed on 2 April 2015. 
115 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark and the Netherlands) (20 
February 1969) (International Court of Justice) ICJ Rep 1969 para 75. 
116 Op cit note 31. 
117 In the Dutch case Public Prosecutor v SHT (1987)74 ILR 162, the Court confirmed that it had jurisdiction 
over a Palestinian (non State Party to the Hijacking Convention). See also the abundant US case law in M P 
Scharf op cit note 99 at 380-82. 
118 M Morris op cit note 105 at 64. 
119 Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of Congo v France) (9 December 2002) (International 
Court of Justice) available at www.icj-cij.org, accessed on 15 June 2015. 
120 C Ryngaert Jurisdiction in International Law (2008) 106. 
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had violated the principle of sovereign equality by exercising universal jurisdiction over 
Congolese citizens. France could not invoke article 5(2) of the Torture Convention because 
Congo, unlike France, was not a Party.121 However, Congo withdrew its application in 2010 
and requested the Court to record the discontinuance of the proceedings.122 
 To summarise, the legality for State Parties to the Torture Convention to exercise 
universal jurisdiction over nationals of non State Parties under article 5(2) remains 
controversial without a clear position by the ICJ on this issue. As to international treaty law, 
the arguments relating to pro-legality are based on the application of the Lotus principle and 
the prohibition of the non-retroactivity for the crime of ius cogens. In contrast, the counter-
arguments are based on the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt and non-retroactivity 
principles. The existence of a customary international law rule authorising State Parties to 
exercise universal jurisdiction over citizens of non State Parties on the basis of an aut dedere 
aut judicare provision is also controversial. The proponents invoke the ius cogens character of 
the torture offence, while the opponents argue the lack of relevant State practice. To answer 
the question about the legality for State Parties to exercise universal jurisdiction over 
nationals of non State Parties under article 5(2) without considering legal developments, a 
practical aspect may be taken into account. Since torture is often committed by nationals of 
States that endorse torture and have not ratified the Torture Convention, limiting the 
application of the Convention to nationals of State Parties would considerably weaken its 
effectiveness.123 Accordingly, the issuance of clear guidelines from an international body  
such as the United Nations International Court of Justice, General Assembly, Security 
Council, Committee Against Torture, Human Rights Committee and International Law 
Commission authorizing universal jurisdiction over nationals of non State Parties to the 
Torture Convention would be suitable. 
D. Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates some legal problems that arise in respect of the scope of ratione 
temporis and ratione loci contained in the Torture Convention. State Parties must face the 
controversial issues relating to the non-retroactivity of the legislation implementing the 
Convention and the legality of the universal jurisdiction over the torture of citizens of non 
                                                          
121 Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of Congo v France) (9 December 2002) (International 
Court of Justice) (Application instituting proceedings) available at www.icj-cij.org, accessed on 15 June 2015.  
122 Certain Criminal Proceedings in France (Republic of Congo v France) (17 November 2010) (International 
Court of Justice) (Press Release) available at www.icj-cij.org, accessed on 15 June 2015. 
123 M Halberstam ‘Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime 
Safety’ (1988) 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 269 at 272.  
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State Parties. The first issue relating to the non-retroactivity of the legislation implementing 
the Convention seems to have received an affirmative answer from European courts. 
Accordingly, presumed offenders could not, under universal jurisdiction, be prosecuted for 
torture offences committed before the implementation of the Torture Convention. In contrast, 
the second controversy relating to the legality of the universal jurisdiction over the torture of 
citizens of non State Parties is far from being settled. However, the existence of customary 
international law rules authorising universal jurisdiction over torture before the 
implementation of the torture Convention and authorising universal jurisdiction over nationals 
of non States Parties under article 5(2) is not established. Indeed, the status of customary 
international law for these two rules is only argued by some scholars without a precise 
analysis of the State practice and opinion juris.  
 The scope of the Torture Convention is nevertheless not the only source of problems 
with regard to the prosecution of acts of torture via the universal jurisdiction over torture. The 
following chapter focuses on more specific problems stemming from the concept of universal 
jurisdiction. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF THE UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
OVER TORTURE 
  
A. Introduction  
As noted previously, the concept of universal jurisdiction is something that has been debated 
frequently. Chapter four discusses within the context of torture the three most controversial 
aspects of the concept of universal jurisdiction. First, the interpretation of the ‘presence of the 
offender requirement’ in the State that exercises the universal jurisdiction, which varies from 
one State to another. Secondly, the operation of the principle of subsidiarity, which continues 
to divide proponents and opponents. The principle of subsidiarity motivates a State that is 
ready to exercise universal jurisdiction over torture, to defer the case to another State that has 
a stronger link with the crime and wants to prosecute it. Thirdly, practical and legal obstacles 
that may prevent a successful prosecution. 
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B. The presence of the offender in the State that exercises the universal 
jurisdiction over torture 
According to article 5(2) of the Torture Convention, a State Party must exercise universal 
jurisdiction over torture offences ‘in cases where the alleged offender is present in any 
territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him’. The interpretation of the 
‘presence of the offender requirement’ in the State that exercises the universal jurisdiction 
over torture is controversial. The most debated question concerns the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction over torture in absentia, that is in the absence of the presumed offender. After the 
concept of universal jurisdiction over torture in absentia is clarified and the arguments pro 
and contra its exercise are addressed, the positions taken by European national courts are 
analysed below. 
 As stated above, the concept of universal jurisdiction in absentia is highly 
controversial. In the Arrest Warrant case,124 the ICJ judges presented contrasting views on 
this issue. While Van den Wyngaert J declared that it is not prohibited under international 
conventional and customary laws,125 Guillaume P and Ranjeva J held contra that international 
conventional law does not know such a jurisdiction.126 Moreover, the two latter judges, 
together with Rezek J, understood ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’ as a separate form of 
jurisdiction less acceptable than universal jurisdiction per se.127 This view resonates with 
some scholars such as Reydams and Cassese.  
                                                          
124 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) (14 February 2002) 
(International Court of Justice) ICJ Rep 2002 at 3. 
125 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (dissenting opinion of Van den Wyngaert J) paras 54, 55 and 58.  
126 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (separate opinion of Guillaume P) para 9 states that no convention including 
a provision similar to article 5(2) of the Torture Convention has contemplated ‘establishing jurisdiction over 
offences committed abroad by foreigners against foreigners when the perpetrator is not present in the territory of 
the State in question. Universal jurisdiction in absentia is unknown to international conventional law’.  
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (declaration of Ranjeva J) para 9 declares ‘that application of the principle aut 
judicare aut dedere is conditional or the alleged offender having first been arrested … These legal developments 
[of the universal jurisdiction] did not result in the recognition of jurisdiction in absentia’. 
127 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (separate opinion of Guillaume P) para 16 states that ‘international law does 
not accept universal jurisdiction; still less does it accept universal jurisdiction in absentia’. 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (separate opinion of Ranjeva J) paras 5 and 6 declares that ‘the Belgian 
legislation establishing universal jurisdiction in absentia for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
adopted the broadest possible interpretation of such jurisdiction … it affords for exercising universal jurisdiction 
in the absence of any connection between Belgium and the subject-matter of the offence, the alleged offender or 
the relevant territory … . [S]everal States have invoked universal jurisdiction to prosecute persons suspected of 
crimes under humanitarian law; unlike Mr. Yerodia, however, the individuals in question had first been the 
subject of some form of proceedings or had been arrested … Under international law, the same requirement of a 
connection ratione loci again applies to the exercise of universal jurisdiction’. 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (separate opinion of Rezek J) para 10 states that ‘the Belgian domestic court 
lacks jurisdiction to conduct criminal proceedings, in the absence of any basis of jurisdiction other than the 
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 Reydams distinguishes three universality principles: the ‘co-operative general’ 
principle, which concerns extradition impossibilities, as per article 5(2) of the Torture 
Convention; the ‘co-operative limited’ principle, which is limited to international crimes; and 
the ‘unilateral limited’ principle, which authorises any States to launch an investigation 
unilaterally, even in absentia. While the ‘co-operative general’ and the ‘co-operative limited’ 
principles are predicated on the presence of the offender, the ‘unilateral limited’ principle does 
not require it.128  
 Likewise, Cassese opposes ‘conditional’ and ‘absolute’ universal jurisdictions.129 The 
former is illustrated by article 5(2) of the Torture Convention: the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction is conditional on the decision not to extradite as well as the presence of the 
offender in the territory under the forum State jurisdiction. The latter requirement is an 
application of the forum deprehensionis principle, according to which the presence of the 
presumed offender on the territory of the State is required ‘for determining the ambit of 
application of criminal law (and therefore of legislative universal jurisdiction), and as a 
consequence it amounts to a requirement for the act to be considered a crime under the 
legislation of the State’.130 Thus, no investigation –– let alone prosecution –– can take place 
as long as the presumed offender is not in the territory, because the criminal law of the forum 
State is not applicable.131 In contrast, under ‘absolute’ universal jurisdiction, a State may 
prosecute a presumed international crime offender regardless whether or not he/she is present 
in the forum State.132  
 Thus, according to Reydams and Cassese, article 5(2) of the Torture Convention, as 
part of international conventional law, cannot authorise the exercise of ‘universal jurisdiction 
in absentia’, which is seen as a distinct category of jurisdiction and independent of universal 
jurisdiction per se.  
 However, other scholars do not agree with the above view. For O’Keefe and Blanco 
Cordero, any consideration of the existence of an ‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’ where 
lawfulness has to be established as a distinctive category of jurisdiction, conflates a State’s 
‘jurisdiction to prescribe’ its criminal law with the logically independent ‘jurisdiction to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
principle of universal jurisdiction and failing, in support of that principle, the presence on Belgian territory of the 
accused, whom it would be unlawful to force to appear’. 
128 L Reydams Universal Jurisdiction. International and Municipal Law Perspectives (2003) 38 and 224. 
129 A Cassese International Criminal Law (2013) 279. 
130 Ibid at 279. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
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enforce’ that law.133 In other words, universal jurisdiction as a head of prescriptive 
jurisdiction beside territoriality, as well as active and passive personality principles, must be 
distinguished from the strictly territorial enforcement in personam or in absentia of this head 
of prescriptive jurisdiction. Accordingly, the lawfulness of the prescription is independent of 
the enforcement.134 As to enforcement and from an international law point of view, 
investigations, the issuance of a warrant, or the pursuance of a trial in absentia is argued to be 
lawful135 because it is adopted in domestic law (generally based on a civil-law tradition).136 
The lawfulness of investigations, the issuance of a warrant, or the pursuance of a trial in 
absentia is not ruled by international jurisdiction law, but by domestic principles and possibly 
by human rights standards.137  
 Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal J confirm that the desirability of the enforcement 
in absentia is a question separate from its permissibility.138 There is no breach of the right of a 
fair trial by the enforcement in absentia,139 while the contrary is often argued.140 The Lotus 
principle allows States to enforce universal jurisdiction in absentia because a prohibitive rule 
does not exist.141  
                                                          
133 R O’Keefe op cit note 4 at 749. See also I Blanco Cordero ‘Compétence universelle’ (2008) 1 Revue 
internationale de droit pénal 79 para 14 who similarly distinguishes ‘compétence normative’ and ‘compétence 
d’exécution’. 
134 R O’Keefe op cit note 4 at 750. 
135 Institute of International Law ‘Resolution concerning universal criminal jurisdiction with regard to the crime 
of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’ (2005), available at http://www.idi-iil.org, accessed on 7 
July 2015, confirms that ‘apart from acts of investigation and requests for extradition, the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction requires the presence of the alleged offender in the territory of the prosecuting State.’  
136 In contrast, they are often in personam in the common-law tradition; R O’Keefe op cit note 4 at 741-42.  
137 C Ryngaert op cit note 30 at 591. 
138 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (separate opinion of Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal JJ) para 56 states 
that ‘some jurisdictions provide for trial in absentia; others do not. If it is said that a person must be within the 
jurisdiction at the time of the trial itself, that may be a prudent guarantee for the right of fair trial but has little to 
do with bases of jurisdiction recognized under international law’. 
139 I Blanco Cordero op cit note 133 at note 112. 
140 See inter alia article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (4 November 1950) 213 UNTS 221.  
Amnesty International Universal Jurisdiction: Questions and Answers (2001) 4 states that a trial in absentia 
should not take place: as ‘the accused should be present during a trial to hear the full prosecution case, to put 
forward a defence or assist their counsel in doing so’.  
R Rabinovitch ‘Universal Jurisdiction in Absentia’ (2005) 28 Fordham Int’l L J 500 at 528-29 argued against 
trials in absentia because juries may ‘draw the inappropriate inference that because the accused may be absent he 
or she is a fugitive and therefore probably guilty’, and that the presence of the presumed offender is essential to 
the adversarial criminal justice system and his/her eventual punishment.  
In the Belgian Sharon case, the Prosecutor held that ‘it might be a violation of the defendant’s right to 
due process’. See C Mallat ‘Sharon trial: 12 February 2003 decision of Belgian Supreme Court explained’ 
(2003) available at https://electronicintifada.net, accessed on 10 July 2015. 
141 S.S. Lotus supra note 100 at 18. See Chapter 3; S Yee ‘Universal jurisdiction: Concept, Logic, and Reality’ 
(2011) 10 Chinese J Int’l L 503 at 525. 
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 Guillaume P and Ranjeva J confuse this permissibility with what is mandatory when 
they state that international conventional law does not know the exercise in absentia of 
universal jurisdiction.142 In contrast to their views, conventional mandatory provisions for 
establishing universal jurisdiction –– as with article 5(2) of the Torture Convention –– design 
the territorial precondition as the lowest common denominator to guarantee the largest 
participation in the convention.143 Thus, the general unavailability of enforcement in absentia 
in common-law States is taken into account.  
 Moreover, Van den Wyngaert J adds that these Conventions establishing universal 
jurisdiction include a provision that ‘does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
accordance with national law’.144 In the case of the Torture Convention, such a provision is 
found in article 5(3). Accordingly, domestic law could provide for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction in absentia.145 
 The European State practice is poor and contradictory with regard to the interpretation 
of the requirement of the presence of the offender under article 5(2) of the Torture 
Convention. The time of assessment of the presence of the offender to exercise universal 
jurisdiction varies from one State to another.  
 French courts strictly interpret the presence requirement to be fulfilled if the presumed 
offender is in the French territory when the proceedings are initiated. In the Congo Beach 
case, the Paris Court of Appeals146 held that article 689-2 of the Code of criminal procedure 
(Code de procédure pénale), which implements article 5(2) of the Torture Convention, 
requires the presumed torture offenders to be present at the time of deliverance of the 
réquisitoire introductif.147 By this legal act, the investigating magistrate (juge d’instruction) is 
seized of the case by the prosecutor (procureur de la République). The name of the presumed 
offender must be included in the réquisitoire to guarantee his/her presence under the French 
territory, so that the investigating magistrate cannot initiate proceedings against persons 
                                                          
142 C Ingelse op cit note 19 at 320. 
143 R O’Keefe op cit note 4 at 751. 
144 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (dissenting opinion of Van den Wyngaert J) para 61. 
145 C Ryngaert op cit note 30 at 591. 
146 Congo Beach (3 April 2004) (Paris Court of Appeals) un-published. In this judgment, the entire proceedings 
against high-ranking Congolese officials inter alia for the torture of nationals were cancelled. See Fédération 
Internationale des Droits de l’Homme ‘France, Compétence universelle’ (2005) available at www.fidh.org, 
accessed on 10 July 2015. 
147 This position was confirmed by the French Court of Cassation: Congo Beach (9 April 2008) and Ung Boun 
Ohr (21 January 2009) (French Court of Cassation), available at www.courdecassation.fr, accessed on 11 July 
2015. 
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outside France.148 Thus, as the investigating judge can-not use investigatory acts to establish 
the presence of the presumed offender, the ‘perverse effect’ of a strict application of the 
presence requirement is that torture prosecutions led by such a judge will be hard, unless the 
presence of the presumed offender is initially clear.149  
 Ryngaert argues that while the Court in the above case only pronounced on the legality 
of the investigations by investigating magistrates, the strict interpretation of the presence 
requirement also applies to preliminary investigations by prosecutors. Indeed, the presence 
requirement of the jurisdictional provision on which the Court pronounced must be applied by 
all magistrates. Accordingly, the filing of a complaint with the prosecutor in the hope that 
he/she would want to pursue the case, is likely to be a no more effective way for them to 
influence the prosecution than would be a civil party petition (constitution de partie civile) 
presented before the investigating judge.150  
 The Paris Court of Appeals, by rejecting the initiation by investigating magistrates and 
prosecutors of any proceedings in the absence of the presumed offender in France, including 
investigations precisely aimed at establishing their presence, urges a return to an obsolete 
French judicial system. In this old system, the Court of Cassation had decided that France had 
no jurisdiction over torture offences if there was no ‘objective and material connecting 
element consisting of the presence’ of the presumed torturer on French territory.151 
Accordingly, it was the complainants — not the authorities after an investigation — who had 
to prove the presence of the alleged offender.152 In the Munyeshyaka case, for instance, 
victims had to provide some indication that the alleged offender was present in France.153 
 The above limitations to the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia are highly 
criticised in relation to the previous arguments in favour of such an exercise. Indeed, as 
indicated above, it is unthinkable that law enforcement authorities could not have the powers 
to locate and catch in their territory a presumed offender who could legally be prosecuted 
under domestic law, no matter where the alleged crime had been committed.154  
                                                          
148 I Blanco Cordero op cit note 133 para19. 
149 C Ryngaert op cit note 30 at 597. 
150 Ibid at 598. 
151 Javor (26 March 1996) (French Court of Cassation) (1996) 100 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 
1083. 
152 C Ryngaert op cit note 30 at 598. 
153 They included in their complaint a newspaper article that mentioned his name in connection with a local 
event. See Human Rights Watch ‘France’ (2006) available at www.hrw.org, accessed on 8 August 2015. 
154 R Rabinovitch op cit note 140 at 517. 
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 If it is the initiation of the proceedings that is relevant to evaluate the presence 
requirement, a subsequent absence after the proceedings’ initiation –– at which the alleged 
offender was present –– would not affect a later trial.155 Article 379-2 of the French Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Code de procédure pénale) confirms the legality of trials in absentia.156 
In the Ely Ould Dah case, the Mauritanian torturer was present in France when proceedings 
were initiated. However, he took advantage of his freedom under judicial control to leave 
France and return to Mauritania. He was meanwhile formally accused by the juge 
d’instruction, referred to the Court of Assises, which tried and sentenced him to ten years 
prison in his absence for having committed torture in the ‘Jreida death camp’.157 Similarly, in 
the Khaled Ben Saïd case, two NGOs assisted a victim to file a complaint for torture against a 
former Tunisian police chief, who become a diplomat posted to France. He left France after 
the opening of a judicial investigation and after having been informed of the charges. The 
case continued in his absence whereupon the Court of Assises convicted him of complicity in 
torture and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment.158   
 Dutch courts adopt a similar approach to the French courts. In the Bouterse case, the 
Hoge Raad159 limited the exercise of universal jurisdiction over torture in absentia, basing 
itself on the Act implementing the Hague and Montreal Hijacking Conventions,160 which 
provides that Dutch courts have universal jurisdiction over hijacking offences ‘where the 
suspect is in the Netherlands’. Nevertheless, as in France, a subsequent absence of the alleged 
offender during the proceedings was allowed if he was initially present in the territory.161 
 The law of Belgium, as opposed to that of France and the Netherlands,162 allows 
prosecution under its general universal jurisdiction clause, even if the alleged offender is not 
                                                          
155 J Sulzer ‘Implementing the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction in France’ in W Kaleck (ed) International 
Prosecution of Human Rights Crimes (2007) 132; REDRESS & FIDH ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 
European Union’ (2010) available at www.fidh.org, accessed on 8 August 2015 at 132. 
156 This article states that ‘an accused who fails to attend the opening of his or her trial without a valid excuse 
shall be tried in absentia. … The same shall apply where the accused is recorded absent during the proceedings 
and it is  not possible to stay the proceedings pending his or her return’ (author’s translation). 
157 Ely Ould Dah (1 July 2005) (Gard Court of Assises) un-published. He is currently serving in Mauritania in 
the national army. See W Kaleck op cit note 32 at 937.  
158 Khaled Ben Saïd (15 December 2008) (Bas-Rhin Court of Assises) un-published. His culpability was 
confirmed on appeal and his prison sentence increased to 12 years. See Khaled Ben Saïd (24 September 2010) 
(Meurthe et Moselle Court of Assises) un-published. He is currently working freely in a ministry in Tunisia. See 
Fédération Internationale des droits de l’Homme ‘Condamnation de Khaled Ben Saïd. Une victoire contre 
l’impunité en Tunisie’ (2010) available at www.fidh.fr, accessed on 18 June 2015. 
159 N Blokker & N J Schrijver op cit note 68 at 296; R Van Elst ‘Universele rechtsmacht over foltering: Bouterse 
en de Decembermoorden’ (2002) 27 NJCM-Bulletin 208 at 222. 
160 Article 4(7) of the Act implementing the Hague and Montreal Hijacking Conventions (10 May 1973) Stb. 
228. 
161 W Kaleck op cit note 32 at 943. 
162 I Blanco Cordero op cit note 133 paras 50-53. 
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present in the territory.163 In any event, the presence of the alleged offender in the territory is 
not required for the prosecutor to launch a preliminary investigation prior to initiating the 
prosecution.164 However, as all offences under universal jurisdiction, prosecution and 
investigation can only be launched at the discretion of the federal prosecutor (procureur 
fédéral) who evaluates, especially taking in account the presence or absence of the alleged 
offender in the Belgian territory if it is in the interests of justice to pursue the matter.165 
Moreover, as described above, it is argued that universal jurisdiction over torture should not 
be exercise in absentia because article 5(2) of the Torture Convention, which is applied in 
Belgium via the general statutory universal jurisdiction clause, clearly provides only for 
obligatory jurisdiction if the suspect is present in the forum State.166 Such a view disregards 
the domestic dimension of the enforcement of universal jurisdiction in absentia.167 
 Belgium, like France, allows for trials in absentia.168 The Belgian and French systems 
permits the proceedings to continue, thus preventing from lapses of time or legal issues 
regarding reasonable delay if the allowed offender has either fled after his release from pre-
trial detention or does not present himself in due time, or is not duly represented by a lawyer 
during the follow-up stages of the procedure.169 
 It must be noted that an automatic link is often drawn between the civil law tradition 
and the acceptance of a trial in absentia170. Such a links seems erroneous: Germany and Spain 
inter alia, while belonging to the civil law tradition, do not allow for the absence of the 
                                                          
163 Art 12(5) of the Belgian Preliminary title of the Code of criminal procedure (Titre préliminaire du Code de 
procédure pénale) states that ‘the prosecution of offences … [committed outside the territory of the Kingdom] 
only takes place if the charged offender is found in Belgium, except in the cases referred in … article 12bis [(the 
universal jurisdiction general clause)]’ (author’s translation). 
164 Article 24 and 28bis of the Belgian Code of criminal procedure (Code d’instruction criminelle) (17 
November 1808) available at www.ejustice.just. fgov.be, accessed on 3 April 2015. 
165 Art 12bis (2) of the Belgian Preliminary title of the Code of criminal procedure (Titre préliminaire du Code 
de procédure pénale) states that prosecutions, including investigation, can only be launched under the federal 
prosecutor’s request, which appreciates the possible complaints’ (author’s translation). 
166 C Ryngaert op cit note 30 at 580. 
167 In this sense, see J Spreutels ‘Position of the prosecution in the Bush case’ (2003) available at 
www.haguejustice portal.net/Docs/NLP/Belgium/Bush_Cassation_24-9-2003.pdf, accessed on 8 August 2003. 
168 Council of Europe ‘Questionnaire concerning judgments in absentia and the possibility of retrial Summary 
and Compilation of Replies’ (2014) available at www.coe.int/tcj, accessed on 30 July 2015 at 20. 
169 For the trials before the tribunal correctionnel, article 186 of the Belgian Code of criminal procedure (Code 
d’instruction criminelle) states that ‘if the summoned person, or the counsel who representates him, does not 
appear on the day and at the time fixed by the summon, he will be judged in absentia’. Similarly, for the trials 
before the Court of Assises, article 286 of the same Code states that ‘if, at the date fixed for the openness of 
debates, the accused who is not in detention does not appear in person or has a counsel representing him, the 
president of the Court of Assises immediately makes an order stating that this accused will be judged in 
absentia’ (author’s translations).  
170 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction op cit note 5 at 54; R O’Keefe op cit note 4 at 741-42. 
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alleged offender during the main proceedings, namely the trial. Investigation is only permitted 
without the presence of the alleged offender.171 
 However, the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia is generally rejected in the 
common-law tradition.172 The accused person must appear, be arraigned and eventually be 
sentenced in person, whether or not he is represented by a lawyer. English courts nevertheless 
have discretionary power, which is exercised with great caution,173 to permit the 
commencement or the continuance of a trial in the absence of the defendant.174 Moreover, the 
‘reasonable prospect’ of the presence of the suspect in the territory is sufficient to initiate an 
investigation.175 
 Trials in absentia may be compatible with the principle of audi alteram partem ('hear 
the other side')176 provided that the rights of the defendant are strictly observed, including that 
he/she is informed sufficiently in advance and is kept informed of further proceedings.177 
He/she must have unequivocally waived the right to appear and to defend him/herself, unless 
he/she was seeking to evade justice.178 The latter exception is particularly relevant because the 
presumed offender subject to universal jurisdiction proceedings often tries to escape justice. 
 To summarise, the concept of universal jurisdiction in absentia is controversial and the 
object of much debate. While some authorities raise it as an independent category of 
jurisdiction, others reduce the allowance of proceedings in absentia to the domestic choice of 
enforcement of an international prescriptive jurisdiction. European State practice seems to be 
consistent with the latter view. One the one hand, European courts have not recognised 
‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’ as a distinct category of jurisdiction.179 On the other hand, 
each State has developed its own enforcement regime of universal jurisdiction over torture. 
Preliminary proceedings (investigation) in absentia are allowed by some (Belgium, Spain, 
Germany, the United Kingdom), and rejected by others (France, the Netherlands). Similarly, 
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the exercise of the main proceedings (trial) in absentia has both proponents (France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom) and opponents (Germany, Spain). 
 From a practical point of view, strictly requiring the presence of the offender reduces 
the possibilities of a successful prosecution.  The first aim of universal jurisdiction, which is 
to avoid impunity by preventing the alleged torturer from escaping the consequences of 
his/her acts by taking refuge in another country, cannot be effectively pursued without its 
exercise in absentia. Delaying the trial in the absence of the defendant increases the 
possibilities of lapses of time and the risk of legal issues regarding reasonable delay. 
Prohibiting investigation before the alleged offender is in the territory prevents any gathering 
of anticipative information and evidence,180 so that bringing him/her before a court would be 
quasi impossible because an alleged offender does not often stay in the territory in which 
he/she might be prosecuted.181 Such a lack of state investment often places on the victims’ 
shoulders the responsibility of the investigation and assembling of the criminal dossier.182 A 
system of international cooperation with regard to information sharing should be established 
to allow prosecutors and investigating magistrates to benefit from information held by other 
states.183 However, it is still unclear if, under international law, the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction in absentia is compatible with the principles of sovereign equality and non-
interference in domestic affairs.184 
C. The principle of subsidiarity  
A second, much debated issue about the concept of universal jurisdiction is the operation of a 
supposed ‘principle of subsidiarity’, which motivates a state, ready to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over torture, to defer the case to another state that has a stronger nexus to the case 
and has the ability and willingness to prosecute it.185 In other words, universal jurisdiction 
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would be merely a ‘secondary mechanism’ and should be exercised only if the territorial or 
national states are unable or unwilling to exercise their jurisdiction.186 
 At the time of the negotiation of the Torture Convention, Italy initially suggested that 
priority be given to the traditional grounds for jurisdiction. It later withdrew that proposal.187 
It cannot, however, be inferred from the current text of article 5 of the Torture Convention 
that the traditional grounds for jurisdiction (contained in article 5(1)) are prioritised in relation 
to universal jurisdiction (per article 5(2)).188 Thus, the state on whose territory torture is 
committed or whose national committed or suffered from such an offence, while being 
entitled to establish its jurisdiction, does not enjoy a primary right to do so. If another state 
finds the alleged offender in its territory, it has an equal right to exercise its universal 
jurisdiction (per article 5(2)), regardless whether or not the territorial or national states are 
also willing to exercise their traditional jurisdiction (contained in article 5(1)).189  
Accordingly, the custodial state is not obliged to waive the right to exercise universal 
jurisdiction by accepting an extradition request.190 
 Some arguments have been advanced to develop the idea of subsidiary universal 
jurisdiction over torture. 
 First, from a practical point of view, territorial or national states have better proximity 
to the evidence, the accused, the victims, and the circumstances of the offence.191  
 Secondly, the idea of subsidiarity is ingrained in the rationale of universal jurisdiction. 
Such jurisdiction was established to permit developed States that have an entrenched system 
of law to prevent gaps of enforcement by developing States that historically have weak 
judicial systems.192 Universal jurisdiction is thus supposed to only be exercised to reduce 
impunity, not on other grounds.193  
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 Thirdly, the concept of subsidiarity protects state sovereignty by promoting non-
interference in internal affairs, as well as the protection of domestic remedies.194 
 Fourthly, establishing a hierarchy of grounds of jurisdiction prevents normative 
conflicts from occurring.195 
 Fifthly, some ICJ judges in the Arrest Warrant case have upheld the subsidiarity idea. 
Guillaume J, referring to article 4(2) of the Hague Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, which establishes the same universal jurisdiction clause as 
contained in the Torture Convention,196 described it as a ‘compulsory, albeit subsidiary, 
universal jurisdiction’.197 Moreover, Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal JJ stated that ‘a 
State contemplating bringing criminal charges based on universal jurisdiction must first offer 
to the national State of the prospective accused person the opportunity itself to act upon the 
charges concerned’.198 
 Finally, with reference to the principle of complementarity applied by the International 
Criminal Court, which allows the Court to exercise complementary jurisdiction when a state 
is unable or unwilling to prosecute,199 Coombes argued that the principle of complementarity, 
which is based on the notion of vertical subsidiarity involving a relationship between a 
supranational institution and a state could be extended to a horizontal milieu involving a 
relationship between states, with one bystander willing to exercise universal jurisdiction over 
torture committed elsewhere, and when the victim and offender are not nationals.200 
 The development of the above arguments has resulted in the growing support that 
scholars,201 academics202 and states203 have given for subsidiarity to become a ‘guiding 
principle’ in the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
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 However, as demonstrated in the next paragraph, the European states’ practice shows 
that some states already apply the principle of subsidiarity in their prosecution of international 
crimes, including torture.204  
 First, some states apply the subsidiarity test as a statutory matter.205 For instance, 
article 12bis of the Belgian Preliminary title of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Titre 
préliminaire du Code de procédure pénale) states that the Federal Prosecutor can refuse to 
initiate proceedings if  
 the specific circumstances of the case show that, in the interest of the proper  administration 
 of justice and in order to honor Belgium’s international obligations, [the] case should be 
 brought either before the international courts, or before the court of the place in which the 
 acts were committed, or before the court of the State of which the perpetrator is a 
 national, or the court of the place in which he can be found, and to the extent that said court is 
 independent, impartial, and fair, as may be determined from the international commitments 
 binding on Belgium and that State.206 
 The above provision can be seen as an application of the subsidiarity principle or of 
the forum non conveniens doctrine, according to which prosecutors and courts only intervene 
if no more appropriate adjudicative fora can be found.207 The provision can be criticised for 
three reasons. First, the general independence, impartiality and fairness of foreign courts are 
the only requirement needed to defer the case to a state with a narrower nexus. It is not 
required that ‘in the given case’, the courts should also be able and willing to judge in an 
equitable way.208 Secondly, the assessment of the ability of foreign courts is determined by 
the easily satisfied criterion of ‘international commitments binding on Belgium and that 
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State’.209 Thirdly, the Federal Prosecutor, who autonomously decides whether or not to launch 
proceedings against international crimes,210 has wide discretion to evaluate the criteria.211 
Accordingly, he/she could easily give up a case, thereby avoiding a difficult or internationally 
embarrassing situation. Therefore, the aforementioned type of a subsidiarity provision could 
lead to impunity.212 Practice has shown that the subsidiarity principle is invoked only when 
the case is effectively submitted to a foreign court; the theoretical competence of another 
court does not suffice.213 
 The second European state practice illustrating the subsidiarity principle relates to 
states that apply the subsidiarity test as a jurisprudential matter. French prosecutors and 
investigating judges defer the case to the territorial state or the state whose national is the 
alleged offender if that state has finalised the prosecution. 214 There is no clear limit on the 
time in which French authorities must exercise their jurisdiction.215 It is nevertheless clear that 
they must wait for the alleged offender to be present in the French territory before starting the 
proceedings.216 The application of the principle of subsidiarity by France was discussed by 
Congo in the Congo Beach case.217 Congo argued that article 5(2) of the Torture Convention, 
which includes the universal jurisdiction clause, gives primacy to traditional grounds of 
jurisdiction, particularly the territorial state, by referring to article 5(1) of the Torture 
Convention.218 However, it is apparent that there was a weakness in the Congo argument: 
article 5(2) only requires that the custodial state either prosecute or extradite the alleged 
offender to a state with a stronger nexus to the case (as per article 5(1)). This does not prevent 
the custodial state from prosecuting if the territorial state is doing so.219 Unfortunately, the 
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out-of-court settlement reached by France and Congo prevented the ICJ from pronouncing on 
the existence of a subsidiarity principle in international law.220 
 Finally, some states apply the subsidiarity test as a guideline for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.221 While the principle of subsidiarity is not enshrined in the United 
Kingdom laws referring to international law crimes, prosecutors who make decisions about 
whether or not to prosecute, have already applied the subsidiarity principle in favour of the 
territorial state, for instance in some cases involving the Rwandan genocide.222 
 Despite the different views among the abovementioned scholars, academics and states 
relating to the subsidiary principle, all at least give primacy to the territorial state. This 
approach is coherent as the state where the alleged offence was committed often has the 
strongest connection with the offence.223 
 For some scholars, the development of the subsidiarity principle has crystallised into a 
rule of customary international law.224 On the contrary, others hold the view that the 
attribution of jurisdiction in international law is not developed enough.225 Accordingly, the 
current support for the idea of subsidiarity must be understood only as a policy consideration 
to facilitate universal jurisdiction.226 In other words, the principle of subsidiarity could only 
be used as an informal standard in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, in conformity with 
the principle of comity in international relations.227 
 Despite the success of the subsidiarity principle, some criticism remains. Human rights 
activists fear the increase of impunity because the territorial state or the state of the offender, 
as directly involved, often does its best to avoid the prosecution of the alleged offender.228 
The behaviour of Congo in the above-mentioned Congo Beach case is relevant in this 
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instance. To guarantee a successful prosecution, priority should thus be given to the first state 
that prosecutes.229 Moreover, to ensure fairer proceedings, it seems more appropriate to make 
the subsidiary test the responsibility of a judicial rather than a prosecutorial authority, because 
of the wide discretion that prosecutors enjoy.230 Finally, applying the principle of subsidiarity 
at the starting point of the investigation limits the possibilities of a successful prosecution. 
Thus evaluating the subsidiarity test after having investigated the offence would permit 
investigations to be held simultaneously in different states, and consequently a sharing of the 
results and evidence collected. This will be to the benefit of the forum state of prosecution, as 
well as in the fight against impunity.231 
D. The remaining obstacles to successful prosecutions 
Besides the issues of the interpretation of the ‘presence of the offender requirement’ in the 
state that exercises the universal jurisdiction over torture, and the operation of a principle of 
subsidiarity, other legal and practical questions are also often debated as they may prevent a 
successful torture prosecution under the universal jurisdiction. 
i) The legal problems 
Remaining legal obstacles to successful prosecution are high.232 Some of the most 
problematic issues are described below.  
 First, the strict rules of evidence in domestic criminal procedures are often criticised. 
States with a common law tradition have often adopted such strict rules. In particular, the 
right to cross-examination, that is, the possibility for the opponent to interrogate a witness,233 
could threaten the successful outcome of a torture trial.234 Torture convictions under universal 
jurisdiction in common law systems nevertheless do occur, but often with the support of law 
enforcement authorities.235 States with a civil law tradition, however, have adopted a system 
of free evaluation of evidence, which render them more amenable to international criminal 
trials.236 In France and Belgium, such offences are often judged before the Court of Assises 
— the criminal court hearing the most serious offences — in which the trial is based only on 
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the oral presentation of evidence, and not on its written nature (oralité des débats).237 Thus, 
evidentiary rules may also be restrictive in civil law.238 
 Secondly, the failure to define the crimes in domestic law according to international 
law is a particular problem. While France239 and Belgium240 have adopted in domestic law a 
definition of torture similar to that in the Torture Convention, the United Kingdom has chosen 
a more restrictive definition. Section 134 of the UK Criminal Justice Act241 limits the scope of 
torture and thus, the possibilities of torture qualification, by requiring further, that torture was 
committed ‘in the performance or purported performance of official duties’.242 Moreover, 
while Belgium243 has, in accordance with the Torture Convention,244 prohibited a superior 
order as a defence, France245 and the United Kingdom246 permit it, thereby limiting the 
possibilities of successful prosecution. 
 Thirdly, another obstacle due to inadequate legislation is the numerous bilateral 
treaties regulating mutual legal assistance. Only a few multilateral treaties on this matter exist, 
but often with limited scope.247 All of these treaties create complex and differentiated 
regimes. Moreover, the many grounds of assistance refusal (double criminality requirement, 
ne bis in idem prohibition, statutes of limitation…; see below) left to political discretion 
prevents the efficient gathering of evidence abroad.248 Accordingly, the establishment of an 
international monitoring mechanism for mutual legal assistance is asked.249 
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 Fourthly, domestic legislation attributing amnesties, pardons or similar measures to 
international law crime offenders are inapposite and prohibited under international law, 
especially because they allow for impunity and deny victims their right to justice.250 
Accordingly, they should not prevent any prosecution or investigation of the alleged 
offender.251 As to torture, the primacy of the prosecution or investigation on amnesties was 
confirmed in the Furundzija252 and Ould Dah253 cases, referring to the jus cogens nature of 
the offence. Moreover, article 7(1) of the Torture Convention254 imposes an absolute duty on t 
State Party to prosecute an alleged torturer if the State Party does not extradite him/her. 
Finally, the Human Rights Committee255 and the Committee against Torture256 criticised the 
use of amnesties for torture.  
 Fifthly, domestic provisions setting the maximum time limit when legal proceedings 
may be initiated after the commission of international law crimes, including torture, are 
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generally accepted as prohibited under customary international law.257 Moreover, similar to 
the case of amnesties, article 7(1) of the Torture Convention admits no exception to the State 
Party duty to prosecute torture in the case of no prosecution.258 The Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights has criticised the use of time limitations when legal proceedings may be 
initiated after the commission of torture.259 States with a common law tradition have generally 
followed this prohibition. In the common law system, crimes are not subject to ‘statutes of 
limitation’, unless specific statutory provisions explicitly indicate so. The United Kingdom 
has not included such a ‘statute of limitation’ concerning international crimes.260 In contrast, 
in states like France261 and Belgium262 that have a civil law tradition, crimes including torture, 
are subject to ‘periods of prescription’, unless a specific provision explicitly excludes their 
application. Neither France nor Belgium have such an exclusion to torture.263  
 Sixthly, the principle ne bis in idem prohibits the prosecution of a person more than 
once for the same criminal behaviour.264 This fundamental guarantee of the right of defence is 
generally applied only at the national level and not to actions of different sovereigns states. 265 
Indeed, states remain reluctant to recognise the principle ne bis in idem for foreign res 
judicata. Accordingly, they often start new proceedings, thereby admitting a second 
prosecution or conviction for the same facts.266 However, some states explicitly recognise 
a res judicata effect or the validity of foreign judgments. Such recognition may take place in 
                                                          
257 It is inter alia referred to article 29 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) 
2187 UNTS 90, which states that ‘[t]he crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any 
statute of limitations’. See L Reydams op cit note 41 at 703. 
258 Amnesty International op cit note 8 at 6. 
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260 Amnesty International op cit note 8 at 32. 
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263 However, articles 136bis, 136ter et 136quater of the Belgian Criminal Code (Code pénal) explicitly exclude 
the applicability of the periods of prescription to international crimes of genocide, war crime, and crimes against 
humanity. Moreover, article 213-5 of the French Criminal Code (Code pénal) does the same as to crimes against 
humanity. See R Alberdina Kok ‘Statutory Limitations in International Criminal Law’ (2007) at 31, available at 
http://dare.uva.nl, accessed on 16 August 2015. 
264 This principle comes from the civil-law tradition, and is similar to the ‘double jeopardy’ doctrine in common-
law. A A Reed ‘Double jeopardy law made simple’ (1997) 943 Yale Faculty Scholarship Series 1807 at 1807. 
265 See ie article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 1966) 999 
UNTS 171 which states that ‘[n]o one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has 
already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country’. 
266 I Blanco Cordero op cit note 133 para 81. 
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the context of a treaty. For instance, the 26 European state members of the Convention of 
Schengen267 (including France and Belgium) apply this principle ne bis in idem to each other 
within their borders. However, the principle is now binding and applicable throughout the EU 
and even in certain non-EU countries such as the United Kingdom.268 Moreover, the 
recognition of the ne bis in idem effect for all foreign res judicata, regardless of the state of 
origin, may also take place in domestic legislation, as in France and Belgium.269 Amnesty 
International asks for the non-applicability of the principle ne bis in idem in relation to 
international crimes, because sham or unfair foreign proceeding could prevent a real trial from 
taking place.270  
 Seventhly, the principle of double criminality requires that the crime must constitute a 
criminal offence both in the territorial state and in the state exercising jurisdiction.271 It is 
argued that such a requirement limiting the possibilities of prosecution does not apply to 
international crimes, but only to crimes of ‘domestic concern’.272 The United Kingdom 
follows suit and has no double criminality requirement for the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.273 Moreover, in Belgium, double criminality is required under the general 
extraterritorial jurisdiction provisions,274 but not in the special provisions for the prosecution 
of crimes under international law. In contrast, France obliges such a requirement for 
international crimes against humanity, genocides or war crimes.275 
 Finally, immunity of certain officials could limit the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
In the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ held that the official position of an alleged international 
                                                          
267 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States 
of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual 
abolition of checks at their common borders (22 September 2000) Official Journal L 239 states that ‘[a] person 
whose trial has been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may not be prosecuted in another Contracting 
Party for the same acts provided that, if a penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, is actually in the 
process of being enforced or can no longer be enforced under the laws of the sentencing Contracting Party’. Ibid 
para 77. 
268 European Commission ‘Green Paper on Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Principle of ne bis in idem in 
Criminal Proceedings’ (23 December 2005) available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu, accessed on 15 August 2015. 
269 Article 360 of the Belgian Code of criminal procedure (Code d’instruction criminelle) states that ‘[t]he 
accused who has been acquitted by a court of assize cannot be prosecuted again for the same facts, regardless of 
their legal description’. Article 368 of the French Code of criminal procedure (Code de procédure pénale) states 
that ‘[n]o legally acquitted person may be retaken or accused for the same facts, even under a different 
qualification’ (author’s translations).  
270 Amnesty International Universal jurisdiction: a preliminary survey of the legislation around the world (2012) 
11.  
271 Ibid; A Cassese International Criminal Law (2003) 283. 
272 REDRESS & FIDH op cit note 155 at 32. 
273 Ibid at 262. 
274 Articles 7 and 10(5) of the Belgian Preliminary title of the Code of criminal procedure (Titre préliminaire du 
Code de procédure pénale). 
275 Article 689-11 of the French Code of criminal procedure (Code de procédure pénale). 
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crime offender is not a defence, nor a basis to deny his/her criminal responsibility, even if the 
crime was committed in the course of his/her official duties.276 However, certain officials of 
foreign governments such as accredited diplomats, current heads of state/government or 
foreign ministers enjoy a temporary procedural immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of 
foreign state, for his/her period of exercise.277 States nevertheless generally broaden the scope 
of the officials enjoying immunity beyond international law. 
 In the United Kingdom, the State Immunity Act278 confirmed the immunity of head of 
States or government. In the Pinochet case, The House of Lords confirmed the right of heads 
of States to immunity from criminal prosecution during their terms of office for any crime 
regardless whether it was committed under official functions or not.279 Moreover, former 
heads of State enjoy immunity to acts carried out in an official capacity. The majority of the 
House of Lords rejected Pinochet’s immunity for acts of torture.280 In addition to heads of 
States or government, the United Kingdom seems to apply immunity to a wider range of 
officials than those referred in the Arrest Warrant case, which attributes immunity to a limited 
number of officials because of the nature of their functions, including visiting ministers, 
armed forces, high commissioners and their diplomatic staff.281 Accordingly, an arrest warrant 
was neither delivered against Israeli Defence Ministers Mofaz in 2004 and Barak in 2009, nor 
against the Chinese Minister for Trade, Bo Xilai, in 2005.282  
 Belgium’s legislation offers immunity to all persons by virtue of treaty or customary 
international law. These would include heads of States and government and foreign ministers 
as long as they carry out their public functions. Furthermore, according to international law, 
no legal action can be taken against persons officially invited to Belgium by Belgian 
                                                          
276 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) op cit note 124 paras 60-61. 
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www.chathamhouse.org.uk, accessed on 10 August 2015. 
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authorities or an international organisation established in Belgium and with which Belgium 
has a headquarter agreement.283 
 France, in contrast, has no specific provision concerning the immunity of alleged 
international crime offenders. Thus, French practice refers to customary international law, 
whereby interpretation of immunity rules is effected by the magistrate granting immunity. 
Such interpretation can, however, vary from one case to another, as they are based on a 
French foreign minister’s discretionary opinion.284 This raises the concern that political rather 
than legal criteria are applied in the determination of immunity.285 In the 2008 Rumsfeld case, 
a French prosecutor dismissed a torture complaint and granted immunity to the alleged 
offender, on account of the French foreign minister’s opinion that argued that he was a former 
US Secretary of Defence.286 
 To summarise, legal obstacles against successful prosecution under universal 
jurisdiction remain high and varied. The forum State often has primary responsibility (by 
having ne bis in idem [B, F] or strict evidentiary [UK, B, F] legislation; or by leaving the 
complex and inadequate systems of mutual legal assistance to political discretion [UK, F, B]), 
thereby sometimes denying the international law position (by failing to define the 
international crimes consistently in domestic law [UK, F]; by granting amnesties; or broad 
immunities [UK, F, B]; or by having double criminality requirements, except for torture [B, 
F]).  
 Not all of the legal obstacles noted above can be suppressed. Indeed, the fight against 
impunity can-not be the pretext for giving up fundamental rights of defence such as 
evidentiary rules or the ne bis in idem principle that have been established for the benefit of a 
peaceful society. Indeed, the prosecution of an international crime must be conducted with the 
greatest regard for the rights of the accused, even more than for ‘classic’ proceedings. First, 
the presumption of innocence of the alleged offender will be abused due to the intense 
publicity given to international criminal proceedings. Secondly, the legitimacy and 
acceptability of the decision is subject to the appearance and reality of fair, independent and 
impartial proceedings.287  
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 Obstacles against the successful prosecution of crimes that fall under the universal 
jurisdiction over torture do not only have a legal characteristic. Some problems are also of a 
practical nature as discussed below.  
ii) The practical problems 
In addition to the legal obstacles described above, practical obstacles to successful torture 
prosecutions under the universal jurisdiction remain abundant. 
 The location of evidence abroad is a recurrent problem.288 Investigating judges and 
detectives often have to go to the territorial state to gather evidence. 289 Such a task, as well as 
the verification of the authenticity of evidence, its transfer and interpretation, is often arduous 
— a fortiori if the territorial state is involved — and expensive.290 In many cases, and despite 
their obligation to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of torture,291 the territorial 
state refuses on-site investigations, or allows them to be conducted only by their own 
authorities.292 This process could, however, be facilitated by the notoriety of the facts,293 and 
by the action of NGOs.294 In the Zardad case,295 evidence of torture in Afghanistan, gathered 
by Scotland Yard detectives in Afghanistan, permitted the conviction of a militia commander 
before an English court.296 
 The location of witnesses abroad is a similar problem. The gathering of foreign 
witnesses is, like evidence, often laborious and expensive. Accordingly, the assistance given 
by victims’ groups and NGOs is often relied on to find foreign witnesses.297 Once found, 
detectives or investigating judges have to convince foreign witnesses to testify. Foreign 
witnesses often do not agree to testify when territorial authorities lead investigations.298 If the 
foreign witnesses agree to testify, their appearance in person during the trial is often requested 
                                                          
288 W Kaleck op cit note 32 at 961. 
289 C Ryngaert op cit note 30 at 608. 
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by courts.299 The transfer of witnesses from abroad, however, also faces many obstacles, 
especially due to high costs. As a remedy, forum states’ governments sometimes grant 
financial assistance to foreign witnesses. In the Pinochet case, such assistance from the 
French Treasury permitted the transfer of French witnesses from Chile to France. This kind of 
remedy nevertheless seems conditional on the witnesses’ possession of the nationality of the 
forum state.300  
 Finally, if the witness is able to give testimony, a programme of protection301 may be 
established by the forum state.302 Such a programme includes security and relocation, as well 
as the provision of new identities for the witness and his/her family.303  
 All of the abovementioned difficulties linked to a foreign witness may be attenuated 
by remote testimony, such as giving anonymity304 or broadcasting the testimony through live 
or recorded video.305 In the above-mentioned Zardad case, for instance, Afghan witnesses’ 
testimony to the court was transferred through a live video link with the British Embassy in 
Kabul.  Such methods are criticised because of their high cost, the slow transmission of data, 
the difficulty to compel a witness and to bring an action for perjury.306 However, the cost is 
less than the witness’ transfer and it can be a compromise for witnesses refusing to transfer to 
the forum state.307  
 Besides the problems linked to the location of evidence and witnesses abroad, a 
successful torture prosecution under universal jurisdiction is also limited by problems of a 
more institutional nature. Criminal justice practitioners, while pursuing the first aim of 
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universal jurisdiction by fighting against impunity, nevertheless contribute to this laxity 
through their lack of competence, organisation, and funding.  
 First, criminal justice practitioners sometimes lack experience and knowledge in 
international law, proceedings abroad, interviews, witness protection, languages, negotiation 
with other enforcement authorities among others, thereby making it difficult for them to 
succeed in proceedings under universal jurisdiction.308 Moreover, prosecutors and 
investigating judges’ motivation to pursue such proceedings are sometimes barred by political 
pressure.309 Indeed, politicians and members of the public are not always aware of the 
objective of universal jurisdiction, or in contrast, voluntarily ignore the benefits of enforcing 
international criminal law against the real costs that may result in respect of their state’s 
political relationships, security and trade.310 For instance, doubts arose about the decision of 
an English prosecutor to drop charges against a Sudanese doctor just before trial because of 
lack of evidence, even though victims provided substantial evidence.311 Moreover, in the 
United Kingdom, proceedings under universal jurisdiction require the approval of the General 
Attorney who is a political official.312 In the Pinochet case, the General Attorney rejected on 
suspected political and non-legal grounds the prosecution of the former Chilean president 
during his presence in the United Kingdom.313 In France, the government was suspected to 
have helped the former Algerian defence minister Nezzar to escape from France by airplane 
after a preliminary inquiry (enquête) had been opened.314 Given the political discretion in 
deciding whether or not to launch proceedings and in order to limit non legal considerations, 
some states like the United Kingdom have adopted some guidelines that the prosecution has 
to follow when deciding to prosecute.315 
 Secondly, the organisation of prosecution under universal jurisdiction is often 
qualified as defective. Clear and competent domestic programmes to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes are generally still lacking. Some states have nevertheless 
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developed specialised units dealing with such crimes.316 While being generally 
underdeveloped and underfunded,317 Belgian, French, German and Dutch specialised units 
have nowadays achieved at least 15 convictions.318 In contrast, states without specialised units 
give priority to prosecution and investigation of domestic cases, thereby neglecting 
international ones. The Crown Prosecution Service in the United Kingdom, for instance, in 
the absence of a specialised unit, has prosecuted only one alleged offender. 319  
 Unfortunately, international criminal prosecution is often limited to the domestic level 
and its establishment of the abovementioned units. However, given the numerous foreign 
characteristics of international crimes, prosecution should take place in parallel at the 
international level,320 a fortiori in this time of increasing transnational criminal activity, 
encouraged by open borders and globalisation.321 Thus, European States’ cooperation has 
been recently improved by the establishment of a network of contact points in respect of 
persons responsible for international crimes322 as well as the commitment to increase 
cooperation between national units.323 These are first steps of international cooperation,324 
which the European Union has to pursue, having in the last few years prioritised its assistance 
to the ICC and international humanitarian law issues, instead of international crimes within its 
borders.325 Amnesty International has recommended that the United Nations establish an 
international body to conduct investigations of international crimes and to assist domestic 
authorities during their investigations. A United Nations body would be more acceptable to 
some domestic authorities than investigators from certain other states.326 
 Finally, at the international level, there is no effective monitoring of state enforcement 
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of international criminal law.327 As to torture, the Committee against Torture monitors the 
implementation of the Torture Convention by States Parties. Unfortunately, it rarely strictly 
recommends to the Parties that they resolve their failures and comply with their obligations.328 
 To summarise, the practical obstacles which impede the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction can be classified in two categories: the problems linked to the location of the 
crime abroad, and those relating to the organisation of proceedings. However, all share a 
financial dimension: gathering evidence and witnesses abroad, transferring and protecting 
them in the forum State, forming members of criminal justice, developing specialised 
prosecution and investigation units, as well as international cooperation programmes and 
effective monitoring organ. Solving these problems as regards the prosecution in universal 
jurisdiction will only be possible if sufficient funds are made available at both domestic and 
international levels. These are critically needed due to the increasing occurrence of 
transnational criminality.329 
E. Conclusion 
The concept of universal jurisdiction is something that has been debated frequently since its 
establishment. However, some issues seem to have been progressively resolved in 
international law and endorsed by European state practice. First, the allowance of proceedings 
in absentia would only be a domestic choice of enforcement of an international prescriptive 
(universal) jurisdiction. Secondly, the principle of subsidiarity would give primacy 
jurisdiction at least to the territorial state that wants and is able to prosecute. The allowance of 
proceedings in absentia and the principle of subsidiarity are respectively beneficial for the 
fight against impunity by permitting broader possibilities of proceedings, and by prioritising 
proceedings in the state that possesses all the elements necessary for a successful prosecution. 
However, these two issues always face some criticism, and have not already achieved a 
customary international law status. Finally, remaining practical and legal obstacles may also 
prevent a successful prosecution. Despite the opposition of international law to some of those 
obstacles and their possible suppression by states, complex problems remain inherent to all 
situations of prosecution of crimes committed abroad. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to consider the following question: ‘To what extent is the 
universal jurisdiction over torture implemented in European countries’? It has been 
demonstrated that these countries, in particular Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, 
have complied with the obligation set out in article 5(2) of the Torture Convention to establish 
universal jurisdiction over torture offences in their domestic legislation. They were, moreover, 
the first countries to conduct torture trials on this ground. However, 30 years after the 
signature of the Convention, such trials rarely occur. The rationale advanced for universal 
jurisdiction over torture was the suppression of obstacles leading to impunity of one of the 
most serious international crimes namely, torture.  This dissertation has demonstrated that, 
since the establishment of the concept of universal jurisdiction over torture, European 
prosecutors and courts face both practical and legal problems in bringing the process of 
justice to a successful conclusion. 
First, article 5(2) is implemented by Belgium in its domestic law by means of a 
general statutory clause that enables the state to exercise universal jurisdiction over any crime 
for which international treaty law obliges such prosecution. This method should be ignored as 
it leads to a less effective prosecution of torture offences than occurs in France and the United 
Kingdom. Article 5(2) has been implemented in France and the United Kingdom by a specific 
provision that recognises universal jurisdiction over torture in their domestic codes of 
criminal procedure. Indeed, the operation of the legality principle can hamper the inference of 
universal jurisdiction over torture offences from the broadly formulated general statutory 
clauses. However, irrespective of the method of implementation, courts and prosecutors from 
Belgium, France and the United Kingdom often characterise an act of torture in a way that 
minimises difficulties arising from prosecution. The Committee Against Torture should make 
states liable for breach of the Convention if the characterisation of an act of torture with 
another international crime leads to the failure of prosecution because of the higher threshold 
of proof that is required.  
Moreover, States Parties must face the controversial issue of the scope of ratione 
temporis and ratione loci in the Convention. The question as to the non-retroactivity of the 
implemented legislation currently seems to have been answered in the affirmative by 
European courts. Thus, presumed offenders could not, under universal jurisdiction, be 
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prosecuted for torture offences committed before the implementation of the Convention. In 
contrast, the second question relating to the legality of the universal jurisdiction over the 
torture of citizens of non States Parties is far from being settled. The frequent commission of 
torture by nationals of such states should help to settle the controversy between pro-legality 
— sustained by the Lotus principle and the prohibition of non-retroactivity for the crime of 
ius cogens — and its opponents — applying the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt and non-
retroactivity principles.  
Finally, some problems stem from the concept of universal jurisdiction itself. 
International law, endorsed by European state practice, seems to have affirmatively solved the 
issues of legality with regard to the proceedings in the absence of the offender — as a 
domestic choice and not as an independent category of universal jurisdiction — and with 
regard to the operation of a principle of subsidiarity that would give primacy jurisdiction at 
least to the territorial state that wants and is able to prosecute. Both solutions, if implemented 
seriously by states, benefit in the fight against torture impunity.  
Other obstacles also remain for a successful prosecution under universal jurisdiction. 
Some are legal such as the ne bis in idem prohibition, strict evidentiary legislation, and 
complex and political systems of mutual legal assistance, which sometimes deny the 
international law position. Some obstacles are practical and are linked either to the location of 
the crime abroad (gathering, utilisation, protection and transfer of evidence and witnesses 
abroad) or to the organisation of proceedings (incompetence of criminal practitioners, 
underdeveloped specialised prosecution units, and lack of international cooperation 
programmes and an effective monitoring organ).  
While the concept of the universal jurisdiction of torture is something that has been 
debated since its establishment, some issues have been solved progressively in international 
law and endorsed by European state practice. That is the case inter alia for the non-
retroactivity of the Convention, the principle of subsidiarity, the proceedings in absentia and 
the prohibition of amnesties. None of these solutions have achieved the status of customary 
international law.  
Despite some progress, some scholars continue to qualify the development of 
universal jurisdiction over torture as ‘disparate’, ‘incoherent’ and ‘poorly understood’.330 The 
main reason is that each state often solves issues about universal jurisdiction over torture or 
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tries to do so in a vacuum. Accordingly, the judicial and political characteristics of each state 
system lead to a different application of universal jurisdiction from one state to another, and 
even in certain cases to a forum shopping phenomenon.  
The suppression of such supposed differences of treatment should be addressed 
through cooperation between states in respect of all of the abovementioned legal and practical 
issues. Indeed, it is recognised that at the inter-state level, a multitude of problems can 
presently be resolved.331 As far as the European Union is concerned, legal harmonisation has 
already begun with ne bis in idem, or mutual assistance legislation. In addition, practical 
cooperation has recently taken place through a network of contact points in respect of persons 
responsible for international crimes as well as a commitment to increase cooperation between 
domestic specialised units dealing with international crimes. The recent acts of terrorism in 
Europe will probably accelerate the cooperation between European States.  
Regional solutions are the first steps toward international common responses to torture 
on the ground of universal jurisdiction. To definitively solve unclarified questions and stop 
differentiated applications, international guidelines concerning the use of universal 
jurisdiction over torture should be adopted. For instance, such guidelines should precise the 
notion of universal jurisdiction over torture, its scopes of application, the requirements to 
exercise it, the rules in case of concurrent jurisdictions, the possibility of proceedings in 
absentia... United Nations bodies seem the most appropriate for this task, including the 
International Court of Justice, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Committee 
against Torture, the Human Rights Committee and the International Law Commission.  
The harmonisation of applications of universal jurisdiction over torture are 
unfortunately not enough to achieve successful prosecutions, while the  elevation of  the 
Committee against Torture as an efficient organ  for monitoring of state enforcement of the 
Convention is a necessity.  
In conclusion, the forum state is identified as having primary responsibility for the 
existence of obstacles to successful universal jurisdiction over torture. This is so especially 
because so few trials are conducted due to inadequate domestic legislation and organisational 
defects. The lack of initiative on the part of the international community as well as of the 
above-mentioned UN bodies is also responsible for the obstacles to successful universal 
jurisdiction over torture — all must be taken into account to explain the lack of satisfactory 
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outcomes under universal jurisdiction over torture. Accordingly, states and international 
bodies have both responsibilities to assess the implementation of universal jurisdiction over 
torture and to correct the abovementioned legal and practical problems.  
Finally, prosecuting universal jurisdiction over torture presents challenges that are 
inseparable from the complex prosecution of crimes committed abroad, such as drug 
trafficking or terrorism cases. Successful prosecution would thus primarily devolve to the 
prosecution and the police service’s motivation to solve those legal and practical problems. 
The importance of the criminal practitioners’ motivation should not be an excuse to provide 
them with a suitable working context that has clear legislation and guidelines over universal 
jurisdiction over torture, and an adequately financed specialised unit for international crimes. 
In contrast, a static situation would lead to negatively affect the criminal practitioners’ 
dedication, which is particularly required to give the full expression for the rationale of 
universal jurisdiction over torture — the fight against impunity — in this time of increasing 
occurrence of transnational criminality. 
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